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Side Constraint Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Neumann
Michael Neumann*
Affiliation:
Trent University
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Extract

The Bible does not in general tell us to maximize or minimize anything. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount do n·ot, for example, tell us to maximize the glory of God. Instead they say, do this, don't do that, where ‘this’ and ‘that’ are replaceable by the name for such categories of action as stealing, committing adultery, and loving thy neighbour.

Until recently, at least, non-maximizing moralists have appeared irrational when confronted with such questions as: what if stealing or lying will save a life? Because they exclude consideration of particular circumstances, the dicta of traditional morality seem myopic and prejudiced next to ‘end-state’ doctrines like utilitarianism, which require that careful empirical investigation accompany virtually every moral decision. To many, traditional morality seems sincere and straightforward, but lacking in intellectual respectability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1982 , pp. 131 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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References

1 Compare Jesse Kalin's formulation of an egoist principle in ‘In Defense of Egoism,’ in Gauthier, David P. ed., Morality and Rational Self Interest (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970) 65Google Scholar et seq.

2 This is not as odd as may seem. That one should not be acted on in such a way that utility is not maximized is a right when such action would be to one's advantage. That one should not prevent or refrain from utility-maximizing actions is a duty when such actions are not to one's advantage. Advantageousness to their bearer is a natural boundary between rights and duties. In any case, other endstate principles would confer more ‘normal’ rights. ‘Maximize innocuous utility,' for example, would give everyone the right to have their utility maximized when such maximization did not detract from the welfare of others. Why shouldn't this be one of the individual rights of which an end-state principle proves to be the mighty bulwark?

3 Kant, Immanuel Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Englightenment?, ed. and trans. Louis White Beck The Library of the Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1959), 47.Google Scholar I will refer to this work as K. Nozick cites H.J. Paton's translation of the passage cited, but the differences are immaterial.

4 See, for example, Matson, W.L. ‘Kant as Casuist,’ in Wolff, Robert Paul ed., Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday 1967) 331-6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Kant, Immanuel Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Louis White The Library of the Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill 1956) 35Google Scholar

6 Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals (John Ladd, tr.), The Library of the Liberal Arts, Indianapolis (Bobbs-Merrill) 1965, p. 105.Google Scholar

7 Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 98Google Scholar

8 Kant, 105

9 Kant, 91, 92ff: ‘the government is authorized to require the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide the most necessary needs of nature for themselves.’ (93)

10 Why, in any case would respect for the phenomenal self be an ultimate value? Noumenal selves, at least, are purely good: they possess that purely good thing, a good will. They are therefore worthy of respect. Phenomenal selves, on the other hand, are usually pretty bad, both in deed and in intent. Why respect them to the point of inviolability? Nozick's side constraints are meant to confer virtually absolute property in the self, and as such they are useful (essential?) to his doctrine of virtually absolute property rights. But perhaps there shouldn't be absolute property in the self. Perhaps degrees of property in the self should vary according to moral merit rather than being maintained at a universal maximum.