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Ross and the particularism/generalism divide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kristian Olsen
Kristian Olsen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 361 Bartlett Hall, 130 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA01003, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

W. D. Ross is commonly considered to be a generalist about prima facie duty but a particularist about absolute duty. That is, many philosophers hold that Ross accepts that there are true moral principles involving prima facie duty but denies that there are any true moral principles involving absolute duty. I agree with the former claim: Ross surely accepts prima facie moral principles. However, in this paper, I challenge the latter claim. Ross, I argue, is no more a particularist about absolute duty than a utilitarian or a Kantian is. While this conclusion is interesting in its own right, it is also important, I argue, because it prevents us from overlooking Ross’s criterion of moral obligation and because it may have implications on the broader debate between particularists and generalists.

Keywords

W.D. Rossmoral principlesparticularismgeneralismJonathan Dancy
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 56 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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