1 I relativize attributions of value to persons and times to accommodate views on which some states of affairs may be valuable for a given person and time but not for other persons or times. (See Ewing's, A.C. “A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good” in Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. by Sellars, W. and Hospers, J. (New York, 1970), p. 127.Google Scholar) The considerations that follow do not depend essentially on these relativizations. Absolute attributions of value can be defined in terms of relativized attributions as attributions of value for every person and time or for every actual and possible person and time.

2 I am not taking a position as to whether there is only one sense in which a desiring may be called ‘warranted’ or as to whether ‘being warranted’ denotes a single property of desirings. These important questions need not be resolved to achieve an understanding of what a reconstruction of value is adequate for present purposes.

3 The qualification ‘epistemic’ distinguishes believings which are warranted “from an epistemic viewpoint” from those which are legally, morally, or, perhaps, theologically warranted. To understand this qualification it would be necessary to distinguish an epistemic viewpoint from legal, moral, and theological viewpoints. No such qualification is introduced with respect to warranted desirings, since our interest is not in desirings which are warranted from a limited viewpoint. By introducing the qualifications ‘morally’ or 'aesthetically’ and characterizing the corresponding viewpoints, the tasks of reconstructing moral or aesthetic value can be distinguished.

4 This conception of the reconstruction of knowledge is derived from discussions with Roderick Firth.

5 I owe the idea of taking states of affairs conceived in this way as the bearers of value to Chisholm's, Roderick “The Intrinsic Value in Disjunctive States of Affairs,“ Nous IX (1975), 295-308.Google Scholar

6 These conditions are not relevant to Q's value for S at t, but only to P's value dependence on Q for S at t as a means to Q. So the conditions necessary for value dependence as a means do not include non-parasitical value conferring factors. A distinct point: If P is to be value dependent on Q for Sat t as a means to Q, some value theorists would require that Q meet conditions beyond being valuable for Sat t. I think the effect of these further conditions is to require that Q be intrinsically valuable for Sat t. Once proximate value dependence is distinguished from ultimate value dependence in Section 4, it should be clear that these value theorists hold that for P to be ultimately value dependent on Q for S at t, Q must meet these further conditions.

7 The literature concerning “the logic of preference” is relevant to value dependence based on logical relations among states of affairs. See Chapter VII and the “Bibliography on the Theory of Value,” Section IV.D. of Rescher's, Nicholas Introduction to Value Theory (New Jersey, 1969).Google Scholar

6 These conditions are not relevant to Q's value for S at t, but only to P's value dependence on Q for S at t as a means to Q. So the conditions necessary for value dependence as a means do not include non-parasitical value conferring factors. A distinct point: If P is to be value dependent on Q for Sat t as a means to Q, some value theorists would require that Q meet conditions beyond being valuable for Sat t. I think the effect of these further conditions is to require that Q be intrinsically valuable for Sat t. Once proximate value dependence is distinguished from ultimate value dependence in Section 4, it should be clear that these value theorists hold that for P to be ultimately value dependent on Q for S at t, Q must meet these further conditions.

7 The literature concerning “the logic of preference” is relevant to value dependence based on logical relations among states of affairs. See Chapter VII and the “Bibliography on the Theory of Value,” Section IV. D. of Rescher's, Nicholas Introduction to Value Theory (New Jersey, 1969).Google Scholar

8 Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), pp. 260-261.

9 Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England, 1903), p. 187. In Ethics (London, 1912) Moore drops talk of “a kind of value being ‘intrinsic“’ and defines (p. 27) what it is for a thing to be intrinsically valuable in terms of the above mentioned test.

10 ‘'Grading, Values. and Choice,” Mind. vol. 67 (1958). p. 490.

11 There may be rnore to account; of intrimic value as that which is valuable” as an end, not just as a meam” than is captured by an independent value account.· As an end’ may convey some feature of intrinsically valuable things beyond their having value other than as a means.ln so far as this is the case.l would attempt to interpret what is conveyed by· as an end’ as a necessary condition for having value other than as a means, rather than as part of the conception of intrinsic value.

12 P is intrinsically valuable simpliciter iff P is intrinsically valuable for every person and time or, perhaps, for every actual and possible person and time.

13 I provide an account of this notion of self-credibility along the lines of the account of intrinsic value presented here in “Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant,“ American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph No.9, 1975, pp. 141-9.

14 The quantification into quotation contexts raises familiar technical problems. These problems can be avoided here and in later passages by adopting more protracted forms of expression. For instance, clause (i) might be rephrased “a statement asserting that P is valuable for S at t belongs to R iff V(P,S,t).“

15 Of course, one need not agree with these value theorists to recognize that their views raise problems for the present account of intrinsic value. One might, for instance, hold that in conditions of the second kind the states of affairs in question must be S paints a good picture at t. In fact, even if this is correct, it requires no change in the above example. Since this state of affairs entails S paints a picture at t, the latter state of affairs could still be valuable without non-logically dependent value.

16 See Moore's Principia Ethica, op. cit., pp. 27-36, and Lewis's, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois, 1946)Google Scholar, Chapter XVI.

17 Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), p. 72.Google Scholar

18 There is a clear discussion of C reconstructions in Ewing's, A.C. The Definition of Good (London, 1948), pp. 93–99.Google Scholar For an exposition of a C reconstruction by an idealist see Chapter III of Bosanquet's, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London, 1919).Google Scholar Paton's, views are expressed in Chapters VIII and XI of The Good Will (London, 1927).Google Scholar For Rawls, ’ view see Chapter VII of A Theory of justice(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971).Google Scholar Rawls can also be interpreted as accepting a MFC reconstruction depending on how his views concerning “primary goods” are construed.

19 “Intrinsic Value,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 26 (1965- 66), p. 14.

20 I explore various versions of this line of reasoning in “Lewis's, C. I. Radical Foundationalism,“ Nous IX (1975), 407-420.Google Scholar

21 I have profited from Romane Clark's efforts at seeing something of positive value in my views. Paul Eisenberg's comments on an earlier draft and discussions with Roderick Firth have been helpful. Reading Chisholm's “On the Intrinsic Value in Compound States of Affairs” (op. cit.) clarified my thought at some points.