Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2020
This paper is devoted to a solution to Moore's problem. After explaining what Moore's problem is and after considering the main approaches toward solving the problem, I provide a definition of Moorean sentences in terms of pure Moorean propositions. My solution to Moore's problem essentially involves a description of how one can contradict oneself without uttering a contradiction, and a set of definitions that exactly determines which sentences are Moorean and which are close relatives of Moorean sentences.
This paper is a slightly modified version of the third chapter of my dissertation ‘Moore's Problem and the Prediction Paradox’. I thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft.
1 Cohen's appeared in Mind, LVIV, 1950) 85-7.
2 Deutscher, Max ‘Bonney on Saying and Disbelieving,’ Analysis, 27, (1967) 184–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Williams's article appeared in Analysis, 39, (1979) 141-2
4 Hintikka, Jaakko Knowledge and Belief, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1962) 90–1Google Scholar
5 Cole's article appeared in Philosophical Studies, 36, (1979) 319-31