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Political Authority, Self-Defense, And Pre-Emptive War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Marvin Schiller
Marvin Schiller*
Affiliation:
Erindale College, University of Toronto
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Extract

The central purpose of this paper is to examine the case for political authority, i.e., the argument for having political authority rather than for having none. Thus, the case for political authority is the case against anarchism. My construction of that case owes much, no doubt, to observations made long ago by Thomas Hobbes and john locke. Nevertheless, these observations have never been stated in a satisfactory and systematic fashion, not even by Hobbes and locke themselves. Hobbes’ observations have, more often than not, been misunderstood, and those of locke have generally been overlooked. However, this paper is not intended to be an exercise in the history of political philosophy. Rather, it is an assessment of a philosophical thesis, namely, that political authority is essential to man's survival and well-being. Although this thesis is rarely contested and, in fact, borders on the commonplace, it is contestable. Moreover, since disenchantment with authority and how it is exercised is growing, an examination of how men are likely to fare in its absence is appropriate. Such an examination is complex, but it is not impossible.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , June 1972 , pp. 409 - 426
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1972

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References

1 I am indebted to W. D. Falk, with whom I have discussed this topic on numerous occasions. John King-Farlow and David L. Mosher made many helpful suggestions. The Canada Council and the University of Toronto generously provided research grants.

2 Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, Michael (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), Part I, chap. xiii, p.82.Google Scholar

3 Ibid., chap. xiv, p. 86.

4 Ibid., chap. xiii, p. 81.

5 Ibid.

6 The paradigm case of preemptive war is a case of A's having committed the first hostile and violent act directly against B, where B had been preparing to do the same to A and where A had good evidence to that effect. On this view, ‘preemptive war’ is a descriptive concept, not a normative one. Consequently, the question of whether preemptive war is ever justifiable is a question which cannot be decided merely by conceptual analysis. There are, of course, many borderline cases of preemptive war which almost imperceptibly become more akin to “offensive war” in contradistinction to “defensive war.” I do not wish to gloss over the difficulties both in clarifying and sharply distinguishing those three types of warfare. However, the above paradigm of preemptive war adequately conveys what I am speaking about when I use that term.

7 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xiii, p. 81.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., chap. xi, p. 64.

9 Hobbes, Thomas The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, Volume II, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. 11 vols.; SirMolesworth, William editor (London: John Bohn, 1841), p. xviGoogle Scholar. See also, Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xiii, pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

10 Paton, H. J. (trans.), The Moral Law: or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1948), chap. ii, footnote, p. 83.Google Scholar

11 Locke, John The Second Treatise of Government in Two Treatises of Government, Revised Edition, edited with an introduction by Laslett, Peter (New York: The New American Library, 1965), chap. iii, par. 19, p. 321.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., chap. ii, par. 5, pp. 310–311, quoting Richard Hooker The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Bk. i, chap. viii, sec. 7.

13 Ibid., chap. ix, par. 131, p. 398.

14 Ibid., chap. ii, par. 13, p. 316; chap. iii, par. 21, p. 323; chap. ix, par. 123, p. 395.

15 Ibid., chap. iii, par. 16, p. 319; see also chap. ii, par. 6, p. 311; chap. iii, par. 19, p. 321; chap. xviii, par. 207, pp. 451–452.

16 Ibid., chap. ii, par. 8, pp. 312–313; see also, par. 7, p. 312.

17 Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments …, chap. vi, pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

18 Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, Volume IV, The English Works …, chap. iv, pp. 110–111.Google Scholar

19 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xiv, pp. 89–90.Google Scholar

20 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xv, p. 103Google Scholar; Philosophical Rudiments … , chap. iii, pp. 45–46.

21 Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments … , chap. iii, p. 45.Google Scholar

22 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xv, p. 94.Google Scholar

23 Green, T. H. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1941), p. 63.Google Scholar

24 Ibid., p. 64.

25 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. xiv, p. 89.Google Scholar

26 Ibid., chap. xv, p. 95.

27 Baier, Kurt The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 309.Google Scholar

28 CF. Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), Book III, Part II, Section II, pp. 494–495.Google Scholar