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Pirates, Kings and Reasons to Ad: Moral Motivation and the Role of Sanctions in Locke's Moral Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Patricia Sheridan
Patricia Sheridan*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph, Guelph, ONN1G2W1, Canada
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Extract

Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 35 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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References

1 I would like to thank Gerry Callaghan for taking the time to read this paper in its various stages, and for his helpful comments. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their insightful suggestions.

2 W. von Leyden argues that for Locke, ‘the development of his hedonism and certain other views held by him in later years made it indeed difficult for him to adhere whole-heartedly to his doctrine of natural law’ (Locke, John Essays on the Law of Nature, Leyden, W. von ed. [Oxford: Clarendon 1954], 14Google Scholar). In a similar vein, Richard I. Aaron writes: ‘Two theories compete with each other in [Locke's] mind. Both are retained; yet their retention means that a consistent moral theory becomes difficult to find. The first is hedonism, which, in Locke's writings, assumes the form that the good is whatever produces pleasure … The second is rationalism, the view that reason alone can determine what is truly good’ (Aaron, Richard I. John Locke [Oxford: Clarendon 1971], 257Google Scholar).

3 All in-text references to the ELN refer to Locke, John ‘Essays on the Law of Nature’, in Locke: Political Essays, Goldie, Mark ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Colman, John John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1983), 71Google Scholar

5 Darwall, Stephen The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Ibid., 37

7 All in-text references to the Essay refer to Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Nidditch, P.H. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975).Google Scholar

8 Locke, John ‘Of Ethic in General’, in Goldie, Locke: Political Essays, 301Google Scholar

9 Locke, John ‘Voluntas’, in Goldie, Locke: Political Essays, 321Google Scholar

10 Darwall, British Moralists, 37Google Scholar

11 Ibid., 39

12 Colman, John Locke's Moral Phüosophy, 49Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 72

14 Locke, John ‘Ethica A’, in Goldie, Locke: Politiad Essays, 319Google Scholar

15 Ibid., 319

16 Darwall, British Moralists, 49Google Scholar

17 Locke, John ‘Of God's Justice’, in Goldie, Locke: Political Essays, 278Google Scholar

18 Ibid., 278