Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T02:37:01.527Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

T. M. Robinson
T. M. Robinson*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In this paper I want to suggest that, while the argued philosophical distinction between logic, epistemolgoy and ontology is one of the many achievements of Aristotle, his predecessor Parmenides was in fact already operating with a theory of knowledge and an elementary propositional logic that are of abiding philosophical interest. As part of the thesis I shall be obliged to reject a number of interpretations of particular passages in his poem, including one or two currently fashionable ones. Since so much turns on points of translation, I note for purposes of comparison what seem to be significant alternatives to my own in any particular instance. The line numbers are those of the DK text.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , June 1975 , pp. 623 - 633
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

* The following abbreviations are used throughout: Burnet= J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy4 (London 1930); DK = Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6 Ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz; Kahn = C.H. Kahn, “The Thesis of Parmenides,” Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969) 700-724; KR = G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge 1957); Mourelatos =Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (Yale 1970); Owen = G.E.L. Owen, “Eieatic Questions,” CQ n.s. 10 (1960) 84-101; Tarán =Leonardo Taran, Parmenides (Princeton 1965); Vlastos = G. Vlastos, Review of J. Zafiropoulo's L'Ecole Eléate, Gnomon 25 (1953) 166-169; von Fritz= K. von Fritz,“ Νοῦς, Νοεῖν and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy 1 ”, CP 40 (1945) 223-242; Woodbury= L. E. Woodbury, “Parmenides on Names”, HSCP63 (1958) 145-160.

I should like to thank the members of a recent workshop on “Parmenides, Zeno, and their Ancient Critics” at the University of Alberta (Edmonton, November 17-19, 1974), from whose comments and criticism I have greatly profited, especially R.A. Cobb, D.J. Furley, Montgomery Furth, A.P.D. Mourelatos, W.M. Pfeiffer, and L.E. Woodbury. Any errors that remain in the paper are my own responsibility.

1. “that it is and cannot not-be” (KR); “that_ is __ , and cannot not-be __,” or “how [__is, and cannot not-be” (Mourelatos).

2. “that it is-not and needs must not-be” (KR).

3. See C.H. Kahn, “The Greek Verb ‘to Be’ and the Concept of Being,“ Foundations of Language 2 ( 1966) 245-265.

4. J.L. Ackrill,JHS 57 (1957) 1f.

5. Kahn, art. cit. 257f., 252; KR ad fr. 3.

6. But cf. Dialexeis I, where proponents of the thesis by their examples, show that they understand the thesis as

7. “for thou couldst not know that which is-not (that is impossible) nor utter it'’ (KR).

8. See LSJ9, s.v.

9. G.E.L. Owen, “Eleatic Questions”, CQ n.s. 10 (1960) 95.

10. “for the same thing can be thought as can be” (KR).

11. G. Vlastos, Gnomon 25 (1953) 68.

12. “it is necessary to say and to think Being” (Tarán).

13. “for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be” (Burnet, KR, Owen); “for there is Being, but nothing is not” (Tarán).

14. “nor shall I allow thee to say or to think ‘from that which is not’” (KR).

15. “thinking and the goal of thinking are one and the same”(DK); “thinking and the cause of the existence of thought are one and the same” (von Fritz, Vlastos); “thinking and the thought that ‘it is’ are one and the same” (Woodbury); “to think is the same as the thought that (the object of thought) exists” (Tarán); “knowing and the goal [or aim or motive] of knowledge are one and the same” (Kahn); “and the same (sc. ) is to think and (is) wherefore [or “that”] is (the) thought [or “thinking”]” (Mourelatos).

16. LSJ 9 S. V., 3.

17. “for you will not find thought without what is, in relation to which it is uttered” (KR); “for you will not find thinking without (finding) Being in what has been expressed” (Tarán); “for you shall not find thinking without what-is, to which it stands committed” (Mourelatos).

18. “according to the mixture that each man has in his wandering limbs, so thought is forthcoming to mankind; for that which thinks is the same thing, namely, the substance of their limbs, in each and all men; for that of which there is more is thought” (KR); “as at any time the mixture of the much wandering body is, so does mind come to man. For the same thing is that the nature of the body thinks in each and in all men; for the full is thought (Tarán).

19. See Tarán, Parmenides (Princeton 1965), ad loc.

20. Op. cit. 256-257.

21. For refs. see Tarán ad loc.

22. Ibid.

23. See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, “Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1968-9, pp. 125–132.

24. For a careful account of the relationship between Parmenides and Rep. 476e ff. see Montgomery Furth, “Elements of Eleatic Ontology”, journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (1968) pp. 111–132.

25. K.J.J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca, 1962) p. 22, n. 7.

26. See Kahn, p. 722. can, depending on circumstance, mean either ‘the real’ or ‘the true’; cf. the common response to Socrates in the dialogues ‘that is true’, or ‘to say what is true’ (Rep. 389c). For Parmenides ‘reality’/‘truth’ is found in any proposition Propounding ascertainment, and its presence is flagged by the reality/truth verb