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On the Theoretical Motivation for Positing Etiological Functions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2019

Björn Brunnander
Björn Brunnander*
Affiliation:
Stockholm University, 106 91Stockholm, Sweden
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Extract

It is a plain fact that biology makes use of terms and expressions commonly spoken of as teleological. Biologists frequently speak of the function of biological items. They may also say that traits are ‘supposed to’ perform some of their effects, claim that traits are ‘for’ specific effects, or that organisms have particular traits ‘in order to’ engage in specific interactions. There is general agreement that there must be something useful about this linguistic practice but it is controversial whether it is entirely appropriate, and if so why it is.

Many theorists have defended the use of seemingly teleological terms by appeal to an etiological notion of function (Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1984, 2002; Neander, 1991; Griffiths, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994; and Buller, 1999). According to the etiological notion, attributing a function to a trait is a matter of pointing to effects that account for why the trait has been selected for.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 371 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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