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Of Epicycles and Elegance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Frederick Adams
Frederick Adams*
Affiliation:
Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI48859, USA
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Extract

I am pleased to be able to respond to Al Mele’s reply to my paper on trying and desire (‘Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams’ and ‘Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try,’ respectively, both this volume). My remarks will bebriet.

First, it is not thesis T (as stated in Mele’s reply) that I find objectionable. It may be possible for me to want TO TRY to quit smoking (prior to trying), while currently not wanting TO QUIT smoking (nor trying to quit). I may want to try because I want to ACQUIRE the desire to quit, since people persist in nagging me to quit. So I accept thesis T because it is not the issue. The issue is whether one can PERFORM THE ATTEMPT to quit smoking WHILE one lacks the desire to quit smoking. THAT is what I find objectionable and impossible. Mele accepts that it is possible. I believe such an attempt to be merely ‘going through the motions’ in bad faith and not a genuine attempt at all. I believe this for the controltheoretic reasons that I outlined in my original paper and elsewhere.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , December 1994 , pp. 637 - 641
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1987

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References

1 In order to keep these remarks brief, I am going to presuppose that the reader of this piece has read and has freshly in mind my original piece and Mele’s reply. So not much background will be supplied.

2 Mele’s Thesis T = It is conceptually possible for an agent, in the absence of a desire to A, to want to try to A and to act on that want.

3 ‘Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try’; ‘Trying: You’ve Got to Believe,’ Journal of Philosophical Research (forthcoming)

4 Mele knows this because we discussed it in Atlanta prior to his submitting the final draft.

5 In a corresponding case with intention, Mele makes a similar move, maintaining that the intention to try A can serve the functional role of the intention to A, when the latter is not available (’She Intends to Try,’ Philosophical Studies 54 [1989] 101-6).