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Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Patrick Rysiew
Patrick Rysiew*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1Canada
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Extract

Knowing that p requires being able to ‘rule out’ the relevant not-p alternatives. Such is the core claim of the Relevant Alternatives (RA) theorist. Of course, to endorse the core claim is not to have a complete and satisfactory account of knowing: any RA theorist has some explaining to do. Most obviously, anyone who endorses the core claim must ultimately provide an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’. And some who‘ve been critical of the whole RA approach have done so because of a scepticism about the prospects of cashing these notions out in a satisfactory way.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 259 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

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