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Modal structuralism simplified

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sharon Berry
Sharon Berry*
Affiliation:
Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem, Israel.
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Since Benacerraf’s ‘What Numbers Could Not Be, ’ there has been a growing interest in mathematical structuralism. An influential form of mathematical structuralism, modal structuralism, uses logical possibility and second order logic to provide paraphrases of mathematical statements which don’t quantify over mathematical objects. These modal structuralist paraphrases are a useful tool for nominalists and realists alike. But their use of second order logic and quantification into the logical possibility operator raises concerns. In this paper, I show that the work of both these elements can be done by a single natural generalization of the logical possibility operator.

Keywords

Hellmanmodal structuralismphilosophy of mathlogical possibilitypotentialismsecond order logicnominalism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , 2018 , pp. 200 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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