1 Cf. Feuer, Lewis S. “Ethical Theories and Histroical Materialism,” Science and Society, VI (1942), pp. 242-272;Google Scholar Hodges, Doftald Clark “Historical Materialism in Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIII (September, 1962), pp. 1-22.Google Scholar

2 Cf. Kamenka, Eugene The Ethical Foundations of Marxism(2d ed. rev; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972)Google Scholar; Hook, Sidney Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx (New York: The John Day Company, 1933).Google Scholar

3 Schaff, Adam A Philosophy of Man (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1963).Google Scholar Allen, Derek P.H. “The Utilitarianism of Marx and Engels,” American Philosophical Quarterly X (July, 1973), pp. 189–199.Google Scholar In the following paper, all page references are (unless otherwise indicated) to Allen's essay.

4 A utilitarian need not hold that the summum bonum must be identified with the decided preferences of individuals (a notion Allen does not explicate). Nevertheless, this is part of Allen's characterisation of Marx's utilitarianism. He offers the decided preferences of individuals as the utilitarian account of the summum bonum, of the “higher activities” to which Marx refers, inasmuch as he believes that any account of the summum bonum in terms of an a priori theory of human nature and intrinsic moral value would be incompatible with utilitarianism (198). I am not convinced that this true. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I generally treat utilitarianism along the lines Allen has suggested.

5 Marx, Karl Capital, Vol. I: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 153.Google Scholar

6 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Tucker, Robert C. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 337.Google Scholar

7 Ibid., p. 350.

8 The characterisation of the position against which Allen argues is frustratingly stated. Allen states it in terms of bourgeois interests being as such evil, ipso facto evil, bourgeois existence being condemned tout court by Marx, and so on. He does not bother to spell out what he means by this. He does want to contrast this position with an amended position which claims that bourgeois interests are prima facie morally wrong/evil. Hence, the above position and its italicised phrases must mean something like bourgeois interests ought never under any conditions to be satisfied, they are wholly and without exception wrong. In short, it appears to be a rigorist position. This would agree with Allen's initial statement that the main problem for a utilitarian interpretation of Marx is that it seems he would leave” prima facie” qualifiers out of such statements as that actions which will advance the social revolution (the interests of the proletariat) ought morally to be performed. Since the proletariat's interests as such ought to be fulfilled, bourgeois interests ought as such, without exception it seems, to be frustrated. The closest Allen comes to stating this thesis straight-out is the following: “bourgeois interests always ought (morally) to be overridden by proletarian interests” (190).

9 Marx's use of the phrase “diametrically opposed” I take to be primarily a rhetorical device. It seems to me that Allen places too much emphasis on this phrase.

10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” p. 336.

11 Ibid., p. 335.

12 Marx, Karl “Money and Alienated Man,” in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, eds. and trans., Easton, Lloyd D. and Guddat, Kurt H. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p. 275.Google Scholar

13 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich The German Ideology, ed., Arthur, C.J. (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 82.Google Scholar

14 Marx, Karl “Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction,” in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,eds. and trans., Easton, Lloyd D. and Guddat, Kurt H. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p. 263.Google Scholar

15 Marx's reference to “the ideological classes” and “the ruling classes” suggests the former criterion. His comments that the French peasantry do not form a class since there is only a local interconnection amongst them suggests the latter criterion. Cf. Mclellan, David The Thought of Karl Marx (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 151–156.Google Scholar Oilman, Bertell “Marx's Use of ‘Class',” The Americal Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (1967-8), pp. 573–580.Google Scholar

16 I do not claim that what has been said here amounts to anything approaching a full characterisation of the various criteria Marx uses for applying the term “class.” I only intend here to suggest that it is more complicated than Allen has indicated. For more complete discussions of Marx's notion of class see the works of Mclellan and Oilman cited in the preceding footnote.

17 Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 121.Google Scholar Also, Oilman, The American journal of Sociology, LXXIII, p. 574. I am indebted to a referee of the Canadian journal of Philosophy for drawing my attention to Oilman's article and for suggesting the distinction I use between being bourgeois and having a bourgeois mentality.

18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, p. 64.

19 I do not intend this list to be exhaustive of the ways in which deontologists have looked or could look to the consequences of actions. I intend it only to be suggestive of the variety of ways in which they have considered consequences.

20 Cf. Santilli, Paul “Marx on Species-Being and Social Essence,” Studies in Soviet Thought, XIII (June, 1973), p. 80.Google Scholar

21 Cf. Avineri, Shlomo The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich The Holy Family, in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, eds. and trans., Easton, Lloyd D. and Guddat, Kurt H. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p. 368.Google Scholar

23 On this interpretation, Marx would be an ideal utilitarian — a different kind of utilitarianism than Allen attributes to Marx.

24 Marx, Karl The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 132.Google Scholar

25 Marx, Karl “The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society,” in The Marx-Engels Readers, ed., Tucker, Robert C. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 83.Google Scholar

26 Marx, Karl The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Struik, Dirk J. (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 112.Google Scholar

27 Marx, Karl “Private Property and Communism,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Tucker, Robert C. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 70.Google Scholar

28 Cf. Marx, Karl “Estranged Labor,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Tucker, Robert C. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 66.Google Scholar Also, Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, ch. 2.

29 Karl Marx, “Private Property and Communism,” p. 71. My emphasis on “as.“

30 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, p. 92.

31 Marx, Karl “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,“ in The Marx-Engels Readers, ed., Tucker, Robert C. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 18.Google Scholar

32 I have benefited in the development of this paper from discussions with Sheldon M. Cohen, Rem B. Edwards, and Glenn C. Graber.