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Leibniz on Agential Contingency and Inclining but not Necessitating Reasons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2022
Abstract
I argue for a novel interpretation of Leibniz’s conception of the kind of contingency that matters for freedom, which I label ‘agential contingency.’ In brief, an agent is free to the extent that she determines herself to do what she judges to be the best of several considered options that she could have brought about had she concluded that these options were best. I use this novel interpretation to make sense of Leibniz’s doctrine that the reasons that explain free actions are merely inclining and not necessitating.
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- © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy
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