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Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2019

Markus Kohl
Markus Kohl*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argue that in the B-edition Kant does not revoke his claim that we can cognize, and (perhaps) even know, that our noumenal selves are absolutely spontaneous cognitive agents.

Keywords

Kantspontaneityfreedom of thoughtfreedom of willapperceptionself-knowledge
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , April 2020 , pp. 395 - 412
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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