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Justification is potential knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper will articulate and defend a novel theory of epistemic justification; I characterize my view as the thesis that justification is potential knowledge (JPK). My project is an instance of the ‘knowledge-first’ programme, championed especially by Timothy Williamson. So I begin with a brief recapitulation of that programme.

Keywords

epistemic justificationknowledgeknowledge firstepistemologyinternalism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 184 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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