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Is a person-affecting solution to the nonidentity problem impossible? Axiology, accessibility and additional people

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Melinda A. Roberts
Melinda A. Roberts*
Affiliation:
The Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, NJ, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper considers two objections based in axiological considerations against the position that whether a given outcome, or possible future or world, is morally worse than a second world may depend in part on what is going on at a third world. Such a wide-angled approach to determining worseness is critical to the solution I have previously proposed in connection with the nonidentity problem. I argue that both objections fail.

Keywords

Nonidentity problemaxiologyaccessibilityperson-affecting intuition
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 2-3: Special issue: Ethics and Future Generations , 2017 , pp. 200 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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