2 Miller, David On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 23Google Scholar. See also Miller, ‘In Defence of Nationality,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 10 (1993), 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Tamir, Yael Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Baier, Annette ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons,’ in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, Partridge, Ernest ed. (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1980)Google Scholar

5 Burke, Edmund ‘Reflections,’ in Philosophy of Edmund Burke, Bredvold, L.I. and Ross, R.G. eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1961), 43–4Google Scholar

6 Freeman, Michael ‘Nation-State and Cosmopolis: A Response to David Miller,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994), 84CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Miller, David ‘Nationality: Some Replies,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1997), 79CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Kymlicka, Will Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989)Google Scholar. See also, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizen (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995)Google Scholar.

9 Danley, John ‘Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991) 168–85Google Scholar

10 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 35ff.Google Scholar

11 McMahan, Jeff ‘The Limits of National Partiality,’ in McMahan, J. and McKim, R. eds. The Morality of Nationalism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 130Google Scholar

12 The best defence that I know of the view that we have a duty of gratitude to past generations is in Becker, Lawrence C. Reciprocity (London and New York: Routledge 1986), Ch. 7.Google Scholar

13 This is the idea of liberalism defended by classical authors like Mill. It is also the position of many contemporary social philosophers. Kymlicka, for example, argues in Liberalism, Community, and Culture that all cultural communities ought to become more liberal. Okin, Susan Moller argues in Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books 1989)Google Scholar that principles of justice ought to be applied to the family.

14 Not all liberals reject past-referring duties. Nozick's, Robert theory of historical entitlement, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974)Google Scholar, makes past referring duties and rights basic to a theory of justice. However, his theory depends upon a view of self ownership that many philosophers regard as implausible. My account can be regarded as an alternative approach compatible with the liberal framework.

15 I am assuming that the individuals engaging in reflection have the properties and values described on 4-5. I do not suppose that they are reasoning from behind Rawls's veil of ignorance. There are a number of reasons why it is not appropriate to use this device. For one thing, I am assuming that individuals know, and are motivated by, their ideas of good, and that they have certain basic moral beliefs. Furthermore, I allow that the conclusions they reach are affected by the nature and values of their particular community. In any case, Rawls's veil of ignorance is a device meant to enable individuals to determine the basic principles of a political society. My purpose is more general. I want individuals to reflect upon their moral responsibilities in relation to the various communities to which they belong.

16 Partridge, Ernest ‘Why Care About the Future?’ Partridge, E. ed. Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 1980)Google Scholar appeals to various psychological theories to argue that individuals need self-transcendent concerns- concerns that he thinks make us care about what happens in the future. Those who do not have these concerns are narcissistic, alienated from others, and fail to live a satisfying life.

17 I am not denying that individuals can make unreasonable demands about such things-demands that others will rightly judge to be unfair or unrealistic. I am also not assuming that demands that are reasonable ought to be fulfilled. There may be other considerations (as I will suggest below).

18 There clearly are promises that are understood to be valid only during the lifetime of the promiser. The obligation ceases when he or she dies. The promises made in marriage vows are obvious examples. However, people also make promises or sign contracts where there is no presumption that the obligation ceases with death. The latter, ‘person independent promises,’ are the commitments that individuals are predisposed to think that their successors should fulfill.

19 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971), 289Google Scholar

20 Joel Feinberg argues that the dead do have interests. See ‘Harm and Self Interest,’ Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart, Hacker, P.M.S. and Raz, J. eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977) 284–308Google Scholar. However, the issue is not merely this, but also whether and to what extent the ‘like cases should be treated alike’ rule applies to them.

21 Partridge, Ernest argues for a similar position in ‘Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect,’ Ethics 91 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘Because the living have expectations and concern for having their own wills respected, they also have an interest in respecting the wills of the deceased. That is to say, it is in the interests of the living … that they maintain the stable and just institutions that secured the wishes expressed by the deceased during their lifetimes’ (261). However, my argument is that we do not merely have an interest in respecting the wishes of the deceased, but (in some cases) a moral obligation to do so.

22 The claim that inherited obligations are compatible with liberalism does not mean that their acceptance is compatible with attitudes and practices in existing liberal societies. Those who argue for inherited responsibilities are often critical of existing policies and attitudes in liberal societies. See Wolin, Sheldon S. ‘Contract and Birthright,’ Political Theory 14 (1986) 179–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar