Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T17:04:29.164Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Individuating Fregean sense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jeff Speaks
Jeff Speaks*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN46556, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

While it is highly controversial whether Frege's criterion of sameness and difference for sense is true, it is relatively uncontroversial that that principle is inconsistent with Millian–Russellian views of content. I argue that this should not be uncontroversial. The reason is that it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an interpretation of Frege's criterion which implies anything substantial about the sameness or difference of content of anything.

Keywords

Fregesensemeaning
Type
Constituents and Constituency
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 634 - 654
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 2007. Semantic Relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heck, Richard, and May, Robert. 2011. “The Composition of Thoughts.” Noûs 45 (1): 126–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Nathan U. 1986. Frege's Puzzle. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.Google Scholar
Schellenberg, Susanna. 2012. “Sameness of Fregean Sense.” Synthese 189 (1): 163–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura. 2005. “Considering Empty Worlds as Actual.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3): 331–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Speaks, Jeff. 2010. “Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 59–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Heijenoort, J. 1977. “Frege on Sense Identity.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1): 103–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David J. 2006. “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.” In Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, edited by Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel and Macia, Josep, 55–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Frege, G. ( 1979). Posthumous Writings. Translated by Long, P. and White, R.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar