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Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2019

Janet Levin
Janet Levin*
Affiliation:
University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, Mudd Hall of Philosophy, Los Angeles, CA90089-0451, USA
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Extract

Introduction

It is standard practice in philosophical inquiry to test a general thesis (of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’) by attempting to construct a counterexample to it. If we can imagine or conceive of an F that isn't a G, then we have evidence that there could be an F that isn't a G — and thus evidence against the thesis in question; if not, then the thesis is (at least temporarily) secure. Or so it is standardly claimed.

But there is increasing skepticism about how seriously to take what we can imagine or conceive as evidence for (or against) a priori philosophical theses, given the many historical examples of now-questionable theses that once seemed impossible to doubt — and also the recent experimental research suggesting that our verdicts on Gettier cases, trolley cases, and the scenarios depicted in other familiar thought-experiments may be affected by cultural, situational, and other adventitious factors.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 391 - 422
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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