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Hume on presentation and philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Maité Cruz Tleugabulova
Maité Cruz Tleugabulova*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Boston University, 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 516, Boston, MA02215, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Most philosophers agree that an argument's presentation is relevant to its philosophical merit. This paper explains why David Hume considered presentation philosophically important. On Hume's epistemology, presentation is closely connected with two principal aims of philosophical arguments: persuasion and epistemic justification. Hume's views imply that presentation is a factor determining an argument's persuasiveness and that, by philosophical standards of justification, presentation is also a factor determining the extent to which an argument's conclusion is justified.

Keywords

Humepresentationargumentbeliefjustificationmetaphilosophy
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue S1: Hume in Alberta: Selected Papers from the 2012 Hume Conference in Calgary , February 2012 , pp. 67 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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