Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-17T19:08:29.269Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Human Habits

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nathan Brett
Nathan Brett*
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In this discussion I shall argue that some fairly widely held views about human habits are mistaken. These misconceptions are important because of the pervasiveness of the habitual in human behavior and because it is the concept of habit that has served as the prototype of various conceptions of conditioned response which are used in psychological explanation. One major task of this analysis is to show that accounts in which actions are explained by reference to rules are not incompatible with accounts in which the same behavior is seen as the product of habit.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 1981 , pp. 357 - 376
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble 1949),Google Scholar Chapter II.

2 I have defended Ryle's account of knowing how elsewhere. See ‘Knowing How, What, and That,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1974-5) 293-300.

3 Winch, Peter The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1958) 57.Google Scholar Winch's discussion of the relation of rules to habits is cast in the form of a refutation of Michael Oakeshott‘s discussion in The Tower of Babel,’ Cambridge Journal, Vol. 2. The thesis that I shall advance conflicts with the views of both theorists, since it allows that behavior can be rule-governed and habitual at the same time.

4 ‘I want to show that the notion of a human society involves a system of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kind of explanation offered in the natural sciences.’ Winch, 72.

5 Winch's test is not adequate since among other things (i) it makes sense to distinguish right and wrong ways of doing many things — e.g. holding guitars, turning on tape recorders, etc. — which are not governed by rules, and (ii) from the fact that I can make these distinctions in dealing with someone else's behavior by utilizing rules, it does not follow that he is following these rules.

6 Ryle, 111. This claim seems clearly false even when read in context. A night watchman making his rounds used to check my office, say ‘Hello’ and (from sheer force of habit) switch off the light leaving me in the dark. I thought this was silly (he would have too, had he realized) though I did not think he should eradicate the habit.

7 James, William Psychology: Briefer Course (New York: Collier 1962) 159, 160.Google Scholar (Originally published in 1892.)

8 Warnock, G.J. The Object of Morality (London: Methuen 1971) 45.Google Scholar

9 White, A.R. The Philosophy of Mind (New York: Random House 1967) 153.Google Scholar

10 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 37. See also Winch 58-60.

11 See for example Melden, A.I. Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1961)Google Scholar and Peters, R.S. The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1958).Google Scholar

12 See for example Rudner, Richard Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1966)Google Scholar Four, Chapter and Ziff, Paul Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1960) 34ff.Google Scholar

13 Hare, R.M. Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1963) 7.Google Scholar

14 In my review of Ganz, Rules: A Systematic Analysis (The Hague: Mouton 1971) I have dealt briefly with some of these issues. See Philosophy of Science 40 (1973) 57-59. A more comprehensive discussion of the nature of rules is in preparation.