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Grounds and ‘Grounds’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bradley Rettler*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX, 76798USA.

Abstract

In this paper, I offer a new theory of grounding. The theory has is that grounding is a job description that is realized by different properties in different contexts. Those properties play the grounding role contingently, and grounding is the property that plays the grounding role essentially. On this theory, grounding is monistic, but ‘grounding’ refers to different relations in different contexts. First, I argue against Kit Fine’s monist univocalism. Next, I argue against Jessica Wilson’s pluralist multivocalism. Finally, I introduce monist multivocalism, explicate three versions of it, and show its advantages.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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