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Ernest Sosa. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007. Pp. xiii + 149.

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Ernest Sosa. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007. Pp. xiii + 149.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Christopher Lepock
Christopher Lepock*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto, Toronto, ONM5R 2M8, Canada
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Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 131 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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References

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