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Drawing a Line: Rejecting Resultant Moral Luck Alone

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2025

Huzeyfe Demirtas Open the ORCID record for Huzeyfe Demirtas [Opens in a new window]
Huzeyfe Demirtas*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
*
Emails: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

The most popular position in the moral luck debate is to reject resultant moral luck while accepting the possibility of other types of moral luck. But it is unclear whether this position is stable. Some argue that luck is luck and if it is relevant for moral responsibility anywhere, it is relevant everywhere, and vice versa. Some argue that given the similarities between circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, there is good evidence that if the former exists, so does the latter. The challenge is especially pressing for the large group that exclusively deny resultant moral luck. I argue that rejecting resultant moral luck alone is a stable and plausible position. This is because, in a nutshell, the other types of luck can but the results of an action cannot affect what makes one morally responsible.

Keywords

moral luckresultant moral luckcircumstantial moral luckconstitutive moral luckmoral responsibilityfree willline-drawing challenge
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 14
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Inc

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