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Desert in liberal justice: beyond institutional guarantees

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

J. P. Messina
J. P. Messina*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it (1) does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and (2) requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society’s basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for ‘giving desert its due’ in a theory of justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert.

Keywords

Desertdistributive justicecoercionenforceabilityethosG.A. Cohenresponsible agency
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 248 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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