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Descartes on the Animal Within, and the Animals Without

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2020

Evan Thomas Open the ORCID record for Evan Thomas [Opens in a new window]
Evan Thomas*
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Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Descartes held that animals are material automata without minds. However, this raises a puzzle. Descartes’s argument for this doctrine relies on the claims that animals lack language and general intelligence. But these claims seem compatible with the view that animals have minds. As a solution to this puzzle, I defend what I call the introspective-analogical interpretation. According to this interpretation, Descartes employs introspection to show that certain human behaviors do not depend on thought but rather on automatic bodily processes. Descartes then argues that animal behavior resembles only those behaviors that are automatic in humans. Analogy thus supports the view that the behaviors of animals do not depend on thought but are, rather, automatic. And if animal behavior is automatic, then animals are best regarded as automata.

Keywords

Descartesanimalsanimal automatismanimal mindsconsciousnessanimal consciousnessbeast-machineintrospection
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 8 , November 2020 , pp. 999 - 1014
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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