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Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mohan Matthen
Mohan Matthen*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.

Keywords

enactive theories of mindperceptual contentrepresentational theories of mindlearningRodney Brooks
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 118 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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