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The cresting wave: a new moving spotlight theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kristie Miller
Kristie Miller*
Affiliation:
The Centre for Time, The University of Sydney, NSW, Australia
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Abstract

One argument for the moving spotlight theory is that it better explains our temporal phenomenology than does any static theory. In this paper it is argued that insofar as moving spotlight theorists take this to be a sound argument they ought embrace a new version of the moving spotlight theory according to which the moving spotlight is a cresting wave of causal efficacy. Hence a range of fundamental properties are temporary because presentness synchronically changesthe fundamental properties that are instantiated in the present moment, and our experiences of presentness co-varies with presentness, allowing us to phenomenologically detect presentness.

Keywords

Timetemporal passagephenomenologymoving presentA-theorymoving spotlight
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 94 - 122
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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Footnotes

With thanks to Michael Duncan, James Norton, Naoyuki Kajimoto, Andrew Latham, Jonathan Tallant and Daniel Deasy for helpful comments on the paper.

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