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Aiding self-knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Casey Doyle Open the ORCID record for Casey Doyle [Opens in a new window]
Casey Doyle*
Affiliation:
St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
Casey Doyle [email protected]St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Abstract

Some self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were she to reflect in certain ways. The expert’s knowledge cannot be transmitted by testimony because self-knowledge cannot be proleptic.

Keywords

Self-knowledgetestimonyPessimismtherapyeducation
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 8 , December 2019 , pp. 1104 - 1121
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2019

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