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Action explanation and its presuppositions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.
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- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018
Footnotes
The author will be at the discipline of Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki from Autumn 2018.