Since the publication of his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein's work has acquired a dubious patina of commentary which makes it appear that he was, without question, a verificationist. A. J. Ayer concludes his criticism of Wittgenstein by holding that descriptive statements need not be “directly verifiable by me.” In his reply to Ayer, R. Rhees only reinforces this view of Wittgenstein as a verificationist by holding that he thought it essential to the significant use of a word that it could be used both rightly and wrongly. If there is no distinction between correct and incorrect in what I say, then “of course … I say nothing” according to Rhees, who thinks he is speaking for Wittgenstein. Norman Malcolm also subscribes to this reading of the Philosophical Investigations. Without the idea of a verifiably correct use, he insists, there can be no idea of a language.