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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
I make no apology for what is by now a hackneyed title. It derives, of course, from Croce’s book on Hegel, and I choose it because I want to suggest that the question ‘What is living and what is dead in Marxism?’ is the right question to ask. The analytical approach is appropriate if it means distinguishing and discriminating between different aspects of Marxism, and refusing to reject or embrace it en bloc as a monolithic creed. However, this does not mean that Marxism can be chopped up into a number of disconnected theses, with a view to producing an inventory of those which are true and those which are false. Marxism claims to be a systematic theory, whose various elements hang together in an organised way. Some would say that this creates an unbridgeable gulf between Marxist and analytical philosophies. Nevertheless, though Marxism’s claim to be systematic should be taken seriously, there are different readings of the theory and of how its components are connected, and different versions will see different elements as central. This is where the careful discrimination of meanings and interpretations is needed. It is not simply a question of deciding whether each of the various elements, in isolation, is true or false, more a matter of deciding where the emphasis should lie if Marxism is to continue to illuminate our understanding of the social world. It is in this sense that we can talk about Marxism or any other theory as ‘living’ — not just as containing true assertions, but as being capable of playing a vital and creative role in human thought and action. In what version, then, if any, is Marxism a living philosophy?
1 See, for instance, Marxism and Morality;, Supplementary Volume VII of the Canadian journal of Philosophy, Nielsen, Kai and Patten, Steven C., eds. (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing 1981)Google Scholar. This includes a comprehensive bibliography by Kai Nielsen. Another important collection is Marx, justice and History;, a ‘Philosophy and Public Affairs’ Reader, Cohen, Marshall, Nagel, Thomas, and Scanlon, Thomas, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980)Google Scholar. A valuable survey is Lukes, Steven, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985)Google Scholar.
2 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. [, Chapter XXV, Section 4; and Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Section II
3 See, again, the collection edited by Nielsen and Patten, especially the essay by Reiman; and much of Nielsen’s own work listed in the bibliography there and incorporated in his Equality and Liberty (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1985).
4 On this, see especially Tony Skillen’s essay in Nielsen and Patten.
5 Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies Vol.2, 4th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962) 211Google Scholar
6 Elster, Jon, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986) 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 Popper, 270
8 Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, ‘Needs, Production, and the Division of Labour’ (in Writings, Early, Bottomore, T., ed. [London: Watts 1963]), 176.Google Scholar Cf. Marx, and Engels, , Collected Works, Vol.3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1975), 313Google Scholar.
9 The tension manifests itself also as a desire on the part of Marxists to have it both ways. Thus Engels maintains that ‘morality has always been class moral- ity; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed.’ He immediately goes on to assert, however, that ‘there has on the whole been progress in morality,’ progress towards ‘a really human morality’ (Anti-Duhring Part I, ch. 9). This will not do. Progress can be identified as such only by reference to values which are not just those of a particular class or a particular epoch. For a different view, however, see Sean Sayers’ contribution to this volume.
10 Marx, and Engels, , The German Ideology Part 1, in Collected Works Vol.5 (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1976) 59Google Scholar
11 Aristotle, Politics 1.3 (trans. J.L. Creed and A.E. Wardman)
12 Freeman, Kathleen, Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962) 148Google Scholar
13 Engels, letter to Joseph Bloch, September 21-22, 1890. The emphasis is Engels’.
14 Engels himself made such a link elsewhere, but failed to draw on it in the present context. See Dialectics of Nature, note on ‘Causality’ in the section headed ’Dialectical Logic and the Theory of Knowledge,’ in Marx, and Engels, , Collected Works Vol.25 (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1987) 510Google Scholar.
15 Collingwood, R.G., An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1940)Google Scholar Part IIIc
16 !bid., 302-3
17 Cohen, G.A., Karl Marx’s Theory of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978) 111-14Google Scholar. Cohen says that work relations are not part of the productive forces, but he nevertheless allows that ‘knowledge of ways of organizing labour is a productive force, part of managerial labour power’ (113, my italics).
18 Cf. Skillen, Anthony, Ruling Illusions (Hassocks: Harvester 1977) 38-9Google Scholar.
19 In thinking about these matters I am grateful for the stimulus of arguments over many years with Sean Sayers. See his contribution to this volume, and his article ‘Marxism and Actually Existing Socialism’ in Socialism and Morality, David McLellan and Sean Sayers, eds. (London: Macmillan forthcoming 1989).