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Teleosemantics and the Epiphenomenality of Content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eric Saidel
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Extract

The naturalistically inclined philosopher of mind faces two related challenges: (1) show how mental content could be part of the natural world, and (2) show how content can be one of the factors responsible for producing (causing) behaviour, that is, show that content is not epiphenomenal. One might pursue the first goal with the intent of showing that mental content is epiphenomenal, but it is more likely that the philosopher concerned with showing how content can be naturalized also expects content to be causally efficacious. Indeed, why pursue the first challenge while holding that content is epiphenomenal? Thus these two challenges overlap: show how content can be naturalized without making content epiphenomenal.

Type
II. Teleosemantics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 27: Naturalism, Evolution & Intentionality , 2001 , pp. 139 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2001

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