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Supervaluations without Truth-Value Gaps*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Hans G. Herzberger
Hans G. Herzberger*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

For a very long time truth-value gaps were under a cloud of suspicion because they were considered logically unmanageable. So Frege declared that:

“as regards concepts we have a requirement of sharp delimitation; if this were not satisfied it would be impossible to set forth logical laws about them”.

Three-valued logic promised to dispel the cloud but in the eyes of many it had promised more than it could deliver. So in response to Reichenbach's plea for a three-valued quantum logic Russell replied:

“This is one of a number of questions as to which I am prevented from accepting a certain view by difficulties in carrying it out, but am prepared to alter my opinion if technical skill supplies an answer to my difficulties”.

‘By now technical skill has supplied many alternative systems of three-valued logic, but few answers and numerous additional difficulties.’

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 6: New Essays in Philosophy of Language , 1980 , pp. 15 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1980

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Footnotes

*

I am very much indebted to Anil Gupta, Robert Martin and Bas van Fraassen for criticism of earlier drafts.

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