Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-b6zl4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-05T16:24:00.475Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Searle on Programs and Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Richard Sharvy
Richard Sharvy*
Affiliation:
2447 Kincaif Street, Eugene, OR 97405, U.S.A.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

… it is possible for a man to write a piece correctly by chance or at the prompting of another: but he will be literate only if he produces a piece of writing in a literate way, and that means doing it in accordance with the skill of literate composition which he has in himself.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II 4 1105a23-35

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 11: New Essays in Philosophy of Mind Series II , 1985 , pp. 39 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1985

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

I thank Daniel Dennett, Edward Erwin, Dale Jamieson, Cristelle Leaf, William G. Lycan, Alice Perrin, and Morton Winston for their good conversation and correspondence on many of these problems. A version of this paper was read to the Florida Philosophical Association in November 1981.

References

Berkeley, George (1709), Essay Towards a New Theory of VisionGoogle Scholar
Hofstadter, Douglas R., ‘Reductionism and Religion’ (comment on Searle). BBS 3 (1980) 433–4Google Scholar
Lycan, William G., The Functionalist Reply (Ohio State)’ (comment on Searle). BBS 3 (1980) 434–5.Google Scholar
Paterson, David., ‘Is Your Brain Really Necessary?’ World Medicine 15, (1980) 21–4Google Scholar
Plato, Republic VIGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V.World and Object, Chap. VII. (Cambridge MS.: MIT 1960)Google Scholar
Searle, John R. ‘Minds, brains, and programs.’ The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980) 417–57 (includes commentaries and replies). Reprinted in Douglas R. Hofstadter and Dandiel C. Dennett, eds., The Mind's I, (New York: Basic Books, 1981) 353-73; and in John Haugeland, ed., Mind Design, (Cambridge, MS.: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 1981) 282-306.10.1017/S0140525X00005756CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sharvy, Richard. ‘It Ain't the Meat, It's the Motion.’ Inquiry 26 (1983) 125–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sharvy, Richard, ‘A Philosophy Experiment.’ Teaching Philosophy (1984) forthcomingGoogle Scholar
Smythe, William E., ‘Simulation Games’ (comment on Searle). BBS 3 (1980) 448–9Google Scholar
Synge, J.L., Talking about Relativity. (Amsterdam: North Holland 1970)Google Scholar