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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Introduction
The identity thesis (IT hereafter) asserts that for every psychological state P there is a neural state N such that P=N. In the hope of rendering IT clear and plausible many identity theorists have compared psycho-neural identity claims to such theoretical identities as temperature is identical with molecular mean kinetic energy. However such a comparison admits a weak and a strong interpretation. According to the weak interpretation, psycho-neural identities are said to be like theoretical identities in the sense that the former are contingent claims just as the latter are presumed to be. Identity theorists have appealed to the contingent status of IT in order to meet prima facie objections of the following sort. We can imagine ourselves undergoing a pain, although we are not undergoing the neural process which the identity theorist claims is identical with the pain. Indeed we can imagine ourselves being in pain and yet not having a brain at all. Hence IT is false. Identity theorists have replied by arguing that this objection merely shows that IT is not a necessary truth, or that psychological and neurological terms do not have the same meaning.
1 Kripke has recently argued that theoretical identities are necessary if true. If x=y, then necessarily x=y, provided ‘x’ and ‘y’ are rigid designators. If Kripke is right, then IT must be necessary if it is true at all. Kripke takes this to show that IT is (necessarily) false. Cf. Saul Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in Identity and Individuation, ed. by Milton Munitz, pp. 135-164. I have argued elsewhere that Kripke's principle does not entail that IT is false. Cf. my “On Kripke's Argument Against the Mind-Body Identity Theory,” Philosophia (forthcoming).
2 Smart considers a token of this type of objection. Cf. J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” in Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Brain Identity, ed. by J. O'Connor, p. 44.
3 Feigl, Herbert, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical',” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Feigl, et al., II, 438Google Scholar.
4 The presentation of the language of the theories here follows that provided by Causey, Robert L., “Uniform Microreductions,” Synthese, 25 (1972), 176·218CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Causey, calls attention to this distinction (p. 183). I have called attention to it elsewhere in order to meet certain objections to the microreduction of psychology to neurology. Cf. my “Fodor on the Unity of Science,” The Philosophical Forum, 3, No.1 (1972), 133·137Google Scholar.
6 Ernest Nagel, “The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences,” in Philosophy of Science, ed. by A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, p. 301.
7 There are some cases where reduction is compatible with the derivation requirement. These cases typically involve theories established on the basis of a limited set of experiments reduced to a larger and similar theory. For example, a theory of the refraction of light in water can be reduced to a more general theory of the refraction of light in fluids, and this theory in turn is reducible to a general theory of the refraction of light in material media. For an analysis of derivational reductions, see Lawrence Sklar, “Inter-Theoretic Reduction in Natural Science” (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1964), pp. 73ff.
8 Feyerabend, Paul, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Feigl, and Maxwell, , III, 28–97Google Scholar.
9 Kemeny, John G. and Oppenheim, Paul, “On Reduction,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Brody, B., pp. 307–318Google Scholar.
10 Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, “The Language of Theories,” in Brody, pp. 343-353.
11 Cf. Schaffner, Kenneth, “Approaches to Reduction,” Philosophy of Science, 34, No.2 (June 1967). 137–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Causey, “Uniform Microreductions,” p. 176.
13 Cf. Sklar, “Inter-Theoretic Reduction in Natural Science,” pp. 7-16.
14 Cf. Carl G. Hempel, “Aspects of Scientific Explanation,” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays, p. 413. The discussion of understanding and the D—N model is indebted to Michael Friedman's discussion in “Explanation and Scientific Understanding” (forthcoming).
15 Hempel,” Aspects of Scientific Explanation,” p. 337.
16 Friedman's discussion contains an outline and criticism of several other accounts of explanation and understanding (Dray's familiarity view, Toulmin's ideals of natural order account, etc.).
17 Albert Einstein, “On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation,” Scientific American (April 1950). p. 3.
18 Oppenheim, Paul and Putnam, Hilary, “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, II, 6Google Scholar.
19 Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological Explanation, p. 112.
20 Fodor, Psychological Explanation, p. 111.
21 Cf. my “Fodor on the Unity of Science“; other issues connected with Fodor's account are discussed in my “Theoretical Reduction and Psycho-Neural Identity Statements” (in press).
22 Cf. Jerry A. Fodor, “Functional Explanation in Psychology,” in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. by M. Brodbeck, pp. 237-238.
23 Fodor, Psychological Explanation, p. 112.
24 Cf. Karl Pribram, “The Neurophysiology of Remembering,” Scientific American (January 1969), in Physiological Psychology, ed. by Richard F. Thompson, pp. 387·398.
25 Cf. my “Identity Thesis and Neuropsychology,” NOUS (forthcoming).
26 For an independent argument that reduction functions must be at least biconditionals see Causey, “Uniform microreductions,” pp. 204-207. This point is made by N.J. Block in “Correlationism” (unpublished). My discussion of identity and correlation is indebted to Block's discussion and to that of Causey, R. in “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions,” Journal of Philosophy, 69, No. 14 (August 3, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Jaegwon Kim, “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory,” in O'Connor, p. 199.
28 Rorty, Richard, “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” journal of Philosophy, 67, No.2 (June 25, 1970), 424CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 Rorty, “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” p. 424.
30 Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical',” p. 461.
31 Brandt and Kim, “The Logic of the Identity Theory,” p. 230.
32 Brandt and Kim, “The Logic of the Identity Theory,” p. 230.
34 Ibid.
35 Sylvain Bromberger, “Why-Questions,” in Brody p. 72.
36 Example from Baruch Brody.
37 Example from Robert Causey, “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions,” p. 418.