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Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Louise M. Antony
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Extract

“Our impartiality is kept for abstract merit and demerit, which none of us ever saw.” -George Eliot, Middlemarch,book 4, chap. 40, 1871.

Naturalized epistemology, as I understand it, is the practice of treating knowledge – human or otherwise – as a natural phenomenon, susceptible of investigation by the methods of empirical science. A naturalized approach to the study of knowledge differs saliently from more traditional forms of epistemology in taking the existence of knowledge for granted. Naturalized epistemologists do not concern themselves with skeptical challenges. Nor are naturalized epistemologists much concerned with questions about what counts as “knowledge,” properly speaking. They do not worry if a bird’s natively specified program for star-based navigation is “justified” for the bird, nor if the sub-personal data structures and algorithms posited by cognitive psychologists can be properly counted as “beliefs.” The naturalized epistemologist is interested in the explanation of anything that even appears to be a cognitive achievement, whether or not it passes muster as “knowledge” in some preferred sense.

Type
I. Moral Naturalism and Normativity
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized , 2000 , pp. 103 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2000

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