2 Scanlon, T. M. “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 103–128;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWilliams, Bernard “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-13;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRaz, JosephPractical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 The reference to sacrifice here does not imply that reasons are exclusively selfinterested; certainly one can be rationally justified in sacrificing a good deal by the prospect of sparing other people-even complete strangers-from comparable harms. I make use of the notion of sacrifice because when one is specifying strength values all that is required is some fixed standard for making comparative judgments, and sacrifice provides one such standard. A good analogy here is with literal weight, and the fact that we can specify weight in ounces, grams, or stone.

4 Although the justifying/requiring distinction is a relatively recent arrival on the philosophical scene, there are a fair number of views in which it figures, either explicitly or implicitly. Besides my own view and that of my father, Derek Parfit's talk of the rough comparability of personal and impartial reasons not only yields a distinction between the justifying and requiring strength of reasons, but even yields the substantive conclusion that altruistic reasons have considerable justifying strength, but little requiring strength. See Derek Parfit, On What Matters (forthcoming). For discussion, see my “Reply to Tenenbaum,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 463-76. Patricia Greenspan's distinction between positive and negative reasons also entails a robust justifying/requiring distinction, as does Jonathan Dancy's substantive distinction between favouring one option and disfavouring the only alternative option. See Greenspan, Patricia “Asymmetrical Practical Reasons,” in Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. Marek, J. C. and Reicher, M. E. (Vienna: Obv & Hpt, 2005), 387-94,Google Scholar and Dancy, JonathanEthics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See, e.g., Dancy, Ethics Without Principles.

6 Dancy himself makes liberal use of phrases such as “more reason to do this or that” and “most reason to do some third thing.” He also seems committed to the idea that “the value of the whole is identical to the sum of the values of the contributing parts” (ibid., 181). Given the very strong link he maintains between values and reasons, this suggests a fairly literal interpretation ought to be given to “most reason.“

7 Gert, Joshua “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons,” Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 533-62,CrossRefGoogle Scholar section 5. For a very similar point, see Berker, Selim “Particular Reasons,” Ethics 18 (2007): 109-39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Thus, though I know he would disagree, I think that David Copp's claims to be talking about something distinct from rationality are not obviously true. I think the best interpretation of his “makes sense,” in his contribution to this volume, is equivalent to my “is rationally permissible.“

9 See Scanlon, T.M.What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 29–31.Google Scholar

10 Because of the relevance of even unknown facts, there is some slight awkwardness in the use of the term “rational” in the labels for these statuses. Rationality is often thought of as a matter of the mental functioning of the agent. Elsewhere I use the phrase “subjective rationality” to pick out this more psychological notion, and “objective rationality” to pick out a domain determined by facts. In what follows I will always assume that agents are aware of all the relevant reasons, so that there will generally be no need to distinguish subjective rationality as a separate status. But it should be kept in mind that I am thinking of the more objective status.

11 Darwall, StephenImpartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 215-16;Google ScholarNagel, ThomasThe Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 1–9;Google ScholarGibbard, AllanWise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. p. 49.Google Scholar

12 Smith, MichaelThe Moral Problem (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 184.Google Scholar See also Goldman, Alan H. “Reason lntemalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 505-32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 See Cohen's “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law,” in Korsgaard, ChristineThe Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167-88CrossRefGoogle Scholar (at 173). See also the passage from Michael Smith in the text below.

14 John Broome seems to endorse the existence of such reasons. See his “Reasons,“ in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. Wallace, R. JayPettit, PhilipScheffler, Samuel and Smith, Michael (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 28–55Google Scholar (at 53). Scanlon is less clear on this issue, but he does seem to hold that wrongness generates reasons that contribute to determining what we have most reason to do. See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 148,Google Scholar and also Scanlon, T.M. “Wrongness and Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5–20.Google Scholar See also Crisp, RogerReason and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 1–2,CrossRefGoogle Scholar for an explanation of this understanding of “moral reason” and a denial that there are any such reasons.

15 Gert, BernardMorality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 341CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff. See also Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 151,Google Scholar for mention of a similar strategy. And see Crisp, Reason and the Good, 14,Google Scholar for an openness to basic altruistic reasons that is compatible with the denial of basic moral reasons.

16 Smith, Michael “Bernard Gert's Complex Hybrid Conception of Rationality,“ in Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, ed. Audi, Robert and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 109-23 (at 121).Google Scholar

17 Here “harm” and “benefit” stand in for lists of consequences that can be specified in non-normative terms.

18 Again, particularists can be expected to bridle at these claims. This is not the place to enter into arguments against particularism, but I would like to register my strong suspicion that the plausibility of particularism about practical reasons stems almost entirely from the following two tendencies: (a) fixing on non-basic reasons as the candidates for reasons with constant weights, and noting that context changes the impact of these considerations on overall rational status, and (b) fixing on good candidates for basic generic reasons, and then switching from a focus on rational status to a focus on moral status.

19 Hume, DavidEnquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A. and Nidditch, P.H. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), sec. ix, p. 294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 See, e.g.: Johnston, Mark “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Aristotelian Society Supplement 63 (1989): 139-74;Google ScholarMcDowell, John “Values and Secondary Qualities,“ in Morality and Objectivity, ed. Honderich, Ted (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985);Google Scholar and Wiggins, David “A Sensible Subjectivism,” in his Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 185–214.Google Scholar

21 Gert, Joshua “Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2009): 718–742.Google Scholar

22 Davidson, Donald “Thought and Talk,” in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984),Google Scholar esp. 159-﹛;0.

23 Viiyrynen, Pekka in his “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 295–324,Google Scholar briefly mentions a number of ways in which reason-determined statuses can themselves provide reasons. But while he seems to regard such reasons as derivative, the present suggestion is that they can be somewhat more independent.

24 Parfit, On What Matters, sec. 54. See also Parfit, Derek “Justifiability to Each Person,” Ratio 16 (2003): 368-90 (esp. 368-70).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Parfit, On What Matters, sec. 49.Google Scholar

26 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 220.Google Scholar

27 See Ridge, Michael “Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity,“ Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2001): 472-81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 214.Google Scholar