1 To appreciate the variety of things that can be called models in physics see Michael Readhead, ‘Models in Physics,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (1980) 154-63.

2 See Gordon Reece, A Generalized Reynolds Stress Model of Turbulence, PhD thesis, Imperial College, University of London (1977); D. C. Leslie, Developments in the Theory of Turbulence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1973), especially ch 13; and for the background L. Landau and E. Lifshitz, Fluid Mechanics (London: Pergamon 1969).

3 See Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage, ‘The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,’ Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948) 279-304, and Angus Deaton and John Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988).

4 See Tim Poston and Ian Stewart, Catastrophe Theory and its Applications (London: Pittman 1978); Vladimir Arnold, Catastrophe Theory (Berlin: Springer 1984), is very eloquent about the wildness of wild applications of the theory; and Christopher Zeeman, ‘Catastrophe Theory,’ Scientific American is very stimulating about the line between explanatory and non-explanatory uses of it.

5 Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983)

6 For example, J.G. Andrews and R.R. MeLone, eds., Mathematical Modelling (London: Butterworths 1976).

7 Colin Howson and Peter Urbach showed, to my surprise, that this is explainable from a Bayuesian point of view. Suppose the prior probability of the theory is fairly high, that of the model zero, the probability of the data conditional on the conjunction of theory and model highish, and that of the data conditional on the theory alone zero. Then on conditionalisation the conjunction of model and theory will rise in probability although that of the model itself will stay at zero.

8 See Fred Dretske, ‘Contrastive Statements,’ Philosophical Review 82 (1973), and Alan Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press 1981). See also 92-5 of Dretske's Explaining Behavior (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press 1988).

9 See Adam Morton, Frames of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980); Robert Gordon, The Structure of the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), for views I approve of, and for a balanced picture see the papers in Radu Bogdan, ed., Mind and Common Sense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press forthcoming).

10 I develop some different similarities between folk psychology and qualitative mechanics in ‘the inevitability of folk psychology,’ in Radu Bogdan's anthology cited in n. 9.

11 I have been greatly helped by conversations with David Hirschmann, David Papineau, and Gordon Reece. Audiences at the Oxford Philosophy of Science club, and Cambridge HPS seminar, and at LSE provided doses of friendly skepticism. The CJP referees’ comments were some of the most helpful I have ever had.