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Equality and Special Concern1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kok-Chor Tan
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Extract

Introduction

The various special concerns and commitments that individuals ordinarily have, for example towards family members, friends, and possibly compatriots, present an interesting challenge for justice. Justice, after all, is said to be blind and imposes demands on persons that ought to be impartial, at least in some respects, to personal ties and relationships. Yet individual special concerns are obviously of moral importance and are deeply valued by participants in these relationships. Thus any conception of justice to be plausible has to be able to accommodate to some extent the various types of valuable and valued special concern characteristic of ordinary social life. In particular, it is important to see how the impartial demands of justice can be maintained while accommodating special concern.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 36: Justice and Equality , 2010 , pp. 73 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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