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Descriptive Phenomenology and the Problem of Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Denis Fisette
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Extract

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of (intentional) consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades (Fisette and Poirier 2000). Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1995), Owen Flanagan (1977), Colin McGinn (1991) and David Chalmers (1996), have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenological tradition. They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 29: The Problem of Consciousness - New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind , 2003 , pp. 33 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2003

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