1 A Theory of justice, (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press. 1971). Rawls is of course not the only contemporary revisionist. Cf. in particular Macpherson, C. B., Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford, 1973).Google Scholar

2 Most notably, Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia. (New York: Basic Books, 1974),Google Scholar Chapter 7.

3 Cf. Teitelbaum, Michael, “The Limits of Individualism”, The journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIX, no.18, October 1972, pp. 545–555;Google ScholarSchwartz, Adina, “Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods”, Ethics, Vol. 84, July 1973, pp. 294-307;Google ScholarEshete, Andreas, “Contractarianism and the Scope of justice”, Ethics, Vol. 85, October 1974, pp. 38-49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. Fisk, Milton's “History and Reason in Rawls’ Moral Theory” in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’A Theory of justice, Daniels, Norman (ed.) (New York: Basic Books, 1975)Google Scholar for a Marxist critique of Rawls which deals with Rawls’ revisionism.

4 Cf. Normal Daniels’ “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty”, who employs a similar approach in his critique of Rawls, in Daniels, op. cit.

5 My account of classical contractarianism is meant to reflect the core and common features of 17th century theory, paradigmatically that of Locke, without embarking on a redundant excursus into textual analysis. The classics are well-known and philosophical analyses of high quality have been done. Cf., particularly, Macpherson, C.B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford 1962).Google Scholar

6 Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Third Part: The Ethical Life, (Oxford 1952).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Cf. Locke, john, The Second Treatise of Government. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), p. 17.Google Scholar

8 See Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, for a full account of this feature of classical liberalism.

9 Cf. Hobbes’ striking characterization of felicity at the beginning of Book XI of Leviathan in which he contrasts his conception of the restless insatiable nature of human striving with the summum bonum of the old moral philosophers.

10 Locke, ibid., p. 20f.

11 This argument was used by such opponents of the Chartists and the philosophical radicals as Lord Macauley and Sir James Macintosh, the same that Cromwell and Ireton raised against the Levellers in the Putney debate.

12 Cf. Macpherson for a defense of the legitimacy of the bifurcation of political and civil rights in the 17th century context of liberal theory. Cf. Possessive Individualism, p. 271ff.

13 In using this term here I do not mean to import the marxist or any other theoretical conception of class. By “working class” or “proletariat” I will here mean no more than something like “those with relatively low income who are not self-employed”, which ought to be compatible with any sociological theory of class.

14 This move was made by the Philosophical Radicals, with virtually no reservations by Bentham, who would exclude only the illiterate, and with some reservations by both James and J. S. Mill. They did not of course appeal to natural rights, nor were they contractarians, but in the nineteenth century it was the utilitarians who shared all important psychological and economic assumptions with the contractarians, who were carrying the expansionist liberal argument.

15 Of course, the ideal of laissez-faire, of no government interference in the economy was never completely realized and survived into the 19th century only as an ideological rallying cry. Capitalists were quite willing to see government aid them by, e.g., financing railroad expansion.

16 One of Rawls’ most provocative stances from the point of view of both Marxists and liberals is his claim that there may be societies in which his two principles of justice are satisfied which have socialist economies. Cf. Rawls, p. 280.

17 Rawls, p. 302, for the full and final statement of the two principles of justice.

18 Rawls, pp. 360-61 and footnote p. 361.

19 Rawls, pp. 264-65.

20 Rawls, p. 7.

21 Rawls, p. 7.

22 Rawls, p. 104.

23 The second principle is qualitied by certain conditions which include that offices and positions be open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. Cf. Rawls, p. 302. Rawls describes the second principle as an interpretation of the principle of fraternity. The difference principle, however, does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off. The family, in its ideal conception and often in practice, is one place where the principle of maximizing the sum of advantages is rejected. Members of a family commonly do not wish to gain unless they can do so in ways that further the interests of the rest. Now wanting to act on the difference principle has precisely this consequence. Those better circumstanced are willing to have their greater advantages only under a scheme in which this works out for the benefit of the less fortunate. (p. 105) This is of interest in connection with his rejection of classical individualism, which is discussed in the next section.

24 Nozick, op. cit., Chapter 7.

25 Rawls, p. 521.

26 Rawls, p. 522-23.

27 Cf. Teitelbaum, Schwartz, cited in footnote 3 for an individualist reading of Rawls.

28 Rawls, p. 18 and p. 129.

29 Rawls, p. 62 and p. 92.

30 Rawls, p. 13 and p. 127.

31 Rawls, p. 302.

32 Rawls associates teleological theories with what he calls “dominant end“ theories. A teleological ethical theory may be either pluralist or a dominant end theory. But there is no necessary connection between teleology and the enforcement of a single conception of the human good for all people.

33 Rawls, pp. 250-257. Cf. Johnson, Oliver, “The Kantian Interpretation”, Ethics, Vol. 85, 1974.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Johnson, on the basis of seemingly impeccable interpretation of Kant claims that Rawls’ theory is heteronomous, that his conception of reason is, from an orthodox Kantian point of view, illicitly contaminated with desire or interest. Rawls counts his Kantianism's chief virtue to be the connections he developed between reason and interest through treating the original position as a “procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative” (p. 256). While Johnson is no doubt on very solid textual ground, one can only hope that Rawls will one day develop his provocative thesis that rapprochement is possible between Kantianism and naturalism. (Cf. p. 250)

34 Rawls, p. 252.

35 Rawls, p. 440.

36 Rawls, p. 426.

37 Rawls, pp. 440-441.

38 Rawls, p. 428, pp. 528-529.

39 Rawls says that a “well-ordered society”, one in which the principles of justice are generally acknowledged and the basic institutions are known to satisfy the principles of justice (pp. 453-454), is a form of social union. Indeed, it is “a social union of social unions.” (p. 527) I take it he means that only in a well-ordered society are social unions likely to flourish and abound, including a generalized community of the whole, rather than that the basic economic institutions of society themselves comprise social unions.

40 Cf. footnote 16.

41 Cf. Teitelman, Schwartz, Echete, cited in footnote 3.

42 Rawls, pp. 441-42.

43 Rawls, pp. 522-25.