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Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andy Clark
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Abstract

Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exemplar- based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplarbased, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition — like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition — depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason.

Type
II. Biology and Moral Discourse
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized , 2000 , pp. 267 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2000

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Footnotes

*

Thanks to Bruce Hunter for some very helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1

Thanks to Bruce Hunter for pointing this out, and for some related comments concerning Kant.

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