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Utilitarianism and the Individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

D. H. Monro
D. H. Monro*
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Extract

Can utilitarianism be reconciled with individualism? The short answer might be that Mill tried to reconcile them, and failed: the quite uncompromising individualism of On Liberty is commonly thought to be inconsistent with his utilitarianism. This is in part because of his rejection of paternalism, which seems to imply that spontaneity and freedom are more valuable than happiness. Mill himself argued that they are, at least in the long run and for the community as a whole, the surest means to happiness. But, while this is defensible, it is hard to see how it could be conclusively demonstrated; and it seems clear that Mill's belief that it is so is the result rather than the cause of his attachment to freedom. Moreover, Mill is, as Fitzjames Stephen pointed out, committed to the assertion that the suppression of opinion always, whatever the circumstances, has worse consequences than not suppressing it; and this seems much too sweeping a principle not to have some exceptions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 5: New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism , 1979 , pp. 47 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1979

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References

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16 Mill, op. cit., p. 58 n.

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