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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
The purpose of this paper is to show that the ‘simple natures’ which appear in the Regulae are those very ‘modes’ and ‘attributes’ of ‘substance’ which appear in all of Descartes’ later works. Contrary to the opinions of some critics, I hope to show that simple natures were not discarded by Descartes for being inconsistent with his later philosophy; that is, if they were discarded at all! I also hope to show that simple natures do not have such a “wide berth” that they are inadequate in dealing with Descartes’ “mature philosophy”. On the contrary, I hope to make it sufficiently clear that they are indispensable for our understanding of the relationship between his epistemology and ontology.
Descartes’ account of ‘simple natures’ is of utmost importance to his epistemology. His account of ‘substance’ constitutes the very essence of his ontology. We shall see that while ‘simple natures’ are all we can know, ‘ substance’ is all that exists. Hence the relationship of simple natures to substance should aid us in understanding the relationship of thought to being. This relationship serves to illustrate the correspondence between knowledge and existence which is the hallmark of Cartesian thought.
1 All references to Descartes’ work are taken from The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Holdane, E. S. and Ross, G. R. T., Cambridge Press, 1970Google Scholar, unless otherwise indicated. I will henceforth refer to these volumes as HRI and HRII.
2 All references to Descartes’ letters are from Kenny, A.'s Descartes’ Philosophical Letters, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1970, P. 141Google Scholar,128 Letter to Regius, January 1642. This work will be henceforth referred to as K — P.
3 HRII, P. 177 and Optics, taken from Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry and Metorology, translated by Olscamp, P. J., Bobbs-Merrill Company, N.Y. 1965, P. 68Google Scholar; see also HRI P. 296, Principle 198. Compare this Scholastic doctrine with that of St. Thomas in Summa Theologica, Part I, Questions 84 and 85.
4 K — P, P. 129, Letter to Regius, January 1642.
5 HRII, P. 95.
6 K — P. P. 128, Letter to Regius, January, 1642.
7 HRII, P. 117.
8 HRI, P. 118.
9 HRI, P. 241, Principle 54.
10 HRI, P. 239, Principle 51.
11 HRII, P. 59.
12 HRI, P. 243, Principle 48.
13 HRI, P. 244, Principle 60.
14 HRII, P. 256.
15 Descartes also claims that order and number are attributes common to both created substances but does not explain this sufficiently.
16 HRI, P. 242. Principle 61.
17 HRI, P. 240, Principle 53.
18 HRI, P. 245— 246, Principle 63; and HRI, P. 245, Principle 62.
19 K— P, P. 129, letter to Regius, January, 1642.
20 HRI, P. 246, Principle 65.
21 HRI, P. 240, Principle 53.
22 HRI, P. 240, Principle 53. A possible example of extension without figure can be found in the small particles in the air which Descartes believed served as a medium by which light is transmitted. So small are these particles, that they can be said to have no figure; at least none that is perceived by us.
23 HRI, P. 244, Principle 61.
24 HRI, P. 245, Principle 61.
25 HRI, P. 240, Principle 52.
26 HRI, P. 42, Rule 12.
27 HRI, P. 26, Rule 8.
28 HRI, P. 41, Rule 12.
29 HRI, P. 232.
30 HRI, P. 238.
31 For a detailed enumeration of the common notions, see HRII, P. 55 — 56.
32 HRI, P. 42, Rule 12.
33 HRI, P. 41, Rule 12.
34 Regulae, Rule 3.
35 HRI, P. 33, Rule 11.
36 HRI, P. 7, Rule 3.
37 HRI, P. 59, Rule 14.
38 HRI, P. 59, Rule 14.
39 K — P, P. 141, June 1643.
40 HRI, P. 57, Rule 14.
41 HRI, P. 27, Rule 8.
42 HRI, P. 42, Rule 12.
43 HRI, P. 43, Rule 12.
44 HRI, P. 43, 59, Rules 12 and 14.
45 HRI, P. 162, Meditation III.
46 HRI, P. 242, Principle 58.
47 HRI, P. 238, Principle 48.
48 HRI, P. 41-42.
49 HRI, P. 448.
50 HRI, P. 41. It is perhaps significant to note that implicit in our understanding of the common notions is the understanding of the “pure and simple essences” of Rule 6. For example, in understanding the common notion that ‘things which do not bear the same relation to a third thing, have some diversity from each other', we necessarily comprehend “pure and simple essences” like one, many, like and diverse.
51 Koyr, Alexanderé, Newtonian Studies, London, 1965.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
52 HRI, P. 41.
53 Plato, Timaeus, in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.), Plato: The Collected Dialogues
54 HRI, P. 241, Principle 55.
55 For a discussion of these two treatments of simple natures see J. HartlandSwann, “Descartes’ ‘Simple Natures’ “ in Philosophy 22 (1947) pp. 139-152. Swann notes that some of the simple natures in the Regulae are referred to as modes of substance in the Principles; nevertheless, he claims that they have no extra-mental reality. The inclusion of the common notions in the third group of simple natures is considered by Swann to be a confusion. His account of the common notions, unlike my own, considers them to exist in the mind, not by an inherent necessity but simply because God so willed.
56 Our direct and immediate knowledge of substance has important ramifications for what is known as Descartes’ vicious circle. The circle is purported to rest on the fact that Descartes assumes the truth or validity of our clear and distinct ideas in this proof that God is not a deceiver. Consequently, it is believed that Descartes assumes what he sets out to prove — namely that our clear and distinct ideas are in fact an accurate reflection of reality. For a clarification of this problem, see Morris, John, “Cartesian Certainty” in the Australasian journal of Philosophy, Vol 47, No. 2; August 1969.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Morris shows that Descartes never falls into a vicious circle because the common notions are never subjected to doubt. Morris’ account differs from my own in the following respects:
1) he assumes that simple natures are ideas or concepts,
2) he therefore claims that the common notions express relations between ideas or objects of knowledge.
It is on the grounds that common notions do not involve relations between thought and extension that Morris argues that they could not be falsified by the evil genius.
57 HRI, P. 64, Rule 14.
58 HRII, P. 56.
59 HRI, P. 162. It is perhaps of some significance to notice that this hierarchy of knowledge in Descartes’ philosophy is extremely Thomist in nature. Implicit in the doctrine of the “objective reality” of ideas is the fact that faith and grace, having their orgin in God alone and existing apart from and even in spite of reason must have a greater degree of certainty than does reason itself.