1 Biographia Literaria 2.6. Cited in Abrams, M.H., The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford 1953) 324Google Scholar.

2 These distinctions between ontological and veridical falsehood are, of course, mine and not Plato's. I do not mean to imply that he did, or would have wanted to, make them. They can, however, help us to focus more clearly on his own distinction between appearance and reality as it concerns works of art.

3 Ross, W.D., Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951), 78Google Scholar

4 Plato's use of eikasia in the Line passage is so difficult a problem in itself as to be of little use to us here. Even Ross admits that supposing images to be originals is a ‘feature of eikasia which was not emphasized in the Line passage' (78). Plato is not at all explicit. Perhaps the best known of the many attempts to connect Republic X with the Divided Line is that of Paton, H.J., ‘Plato's Theory of Eikasia,’ Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 22 (1921-22) 69–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Paton does not, however, agree with Ross that eikasia involves supposing images to be originals.

5 Plato's argument involves a pun on the noun poiētēs, meaning both ‘maker' (craftsman) and ‘poet,’ and on the verb poiein ('to make’ and ‘to write poetry’): The good poiētēs … must poiein with knowledge or he won't be able to poiein at all’ (598e3-5). A similar pun is involved in the criticism of painting as ‘far from the truth’ (598b6). Alētheia, ‘truth,’ is a technical term in painting meaning 'accurate representation.’ Thus, the painting that is ‘far from the truth’ is a bad painting. For a discussion of alētheia in the visual arts see Pollitt, J., The Ancient View of Greek Art (New Haven and London 1974), 125-38Google Scholar.

6 For the sake of convenience I treat #7 and #8 as forms of belief here. I do not mean to assume, however, that the lower part of the soul is simply concerned with making intellectual Judgments. See further below, The City-Soul Analogy.'

7 On skiagraphia see Keuls, E., Plato and Greek Painting (Leiden 1978), 59–87Google Scholar and note 12, below.

8 I owe this point, and some valuable discussion of the problems of color and distance, to James Bogen, in conversation.

9 598b8-cl. I follow James Adam's translation of this passage, in The Republic of Plato² (Cambridge 1963), ad loc. Adam notes that he was puzzled by this passage and once tried to amend it. Shorey, P. calls the shift from talk of artefacts and ontology to talk of people and craftsmanship an ‘inconcinnity’ in 'Illogical Idiom; TAPA. 47 (1916) 207Google Scholar. J. Moravcsik, in Noetic Aspiration and Artistic Inspiration; (in Moravcsik, J. and Temko, P., eds. Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts [Totowa, NJ 1982], 29–46Google Scholar), points out that the artist differs from the craftsman in not knowing the functional specifications of the objects he represents. See also V. Menza, ‘Poetry and the Technē Theory: An Analysis of the Ion and Republic, Bks. III and X; (diss., Johns Hopkins University 1972) 263-4, 282-4, who has correctly seen that Plato's chief concern in Republic X is with craftsmanship.

10 Gorgias 5l5d-e makes the point about Pericles. Cf. Gorgias 456b-c, 464d-e, for a similar point about the triumph of the rhetorician over the doctor, among the ignorant. The parallels between rhetoric in the Gorgias and imitative poetry in Republic X are striking. Rhetoric in the Gorgias is a ‘technique of persuasion' (459b-c), a form of flattery that achieves its ends by means of pleasure (462c-e, 464d and passim). It is analogous to cosmetology, a form of flattery impersonating gymnastics, appealing to us by means of an ‘alien beauty’ that makes us neglect the natural beauty produced by health and exercise (465b). This comparison with cosmetics is also evident in Republic X.601a-b, where poetry stripped of its ‘colors’ (meter, rhythm and harmony) is compared to an ugly old face. In the Gorgias, however, Plato accuses the rhetorician of immediate and straightforward deceit. The more sophisticated psychology of the Republic allows him to give a more subtle account of the effects of imitative poetry on its audience.

11 In this passage the sophists ‘induce’ the young men to follow them (600c8). In a very similar passage in the Apology, Gorgias, Hippias and Prodicus ‘persuade' young men (19e6). Plato would seem to be deliberately avoiding mention of Gorgias and persuasion in the Republic passage. In fact, peithō and its cognates are never used of the imitator in Republic X. The verb cognate with peithō occurs at 604b6 and at 600el, where, in an interesting reversal, Plato says that people did not try to persuade poets to teach them. Pistis ('belief’) and cognates occur at 601e5, 601e7, 603a4, 603b9. They also are not used of the effects of the imitator on his audience. Mimētikē is not simply a technique of persuasion, and Plato's use of language underlines this fact.

12 Keuls discusses color and distance in skiagraphia and concludes that skiagraphia uses the Juxtaposition of patches of contrasting colors to produce the ,illusion of a single color when seen from a distance. Plato mentions skiagraphia at 602d2 and may well be thinking of it at 598c. We should not, however, think that his point at 598c is that what accurately reproduces an appropriate color or shape under distant viewing conditions does not do so under nearer viewing conditions, and that only children and fools fail to realize this fact. Plato's point is rather that both painter and viewer are ignorant of the true standard of function and Judge instead by appearances alone. The one cannot make or the other Judge what reproduces appropriate color or shape under any viewing conditions. The nearer view does not, then, by itself lead children and fools to recognize that the painter has distorted true shape and color, for they have no knowledge of these, but it may lead them to question the standard of appearances that leads them to have different views of the same thing. They are then more ready to turn to the true standard of function, questioning the painter and his works.

13 Sophist 234b-c, cf. Republic X.603a12: ‘far from wisdom.’ Plato uses the concept of distance in several different ways in the Sophist and in Republic X, as Else, G. points out in The Date and Structure of Book X of Plato's Republic (Heidelberg 1972), 38-9Google Scholar.

14 A similar point is made by Moravcsik.

15 On the painter-poet analogy see further my The Role of the Visual Arts in Plato's Ideal State,’ The Journal of the Theory and Criticism of The Visual Arts (Tempe, Arizona), 1 (1981) 115-27.

16 The metaphor of ‘rule’ occurs frequently: ἄρχϵιν (602d7), ἐγχρατϵῖζ (605b5), ἄρχουτα … ἄρχϵσθαι (606d5), βασιƛϵύσϵτου (607a6).

17 See the discussion of mistake #6 (mistaking the apparently beautiful for the really beautiful) of the children and fools, above, 49.

18 604b9-c3. See the discussion of mistake #8 above, 43-4.

19 While the superior part of the soul is twice called to logistikon (602e1, 605b5), the inferior part of the soul is never given a name. (I take ἀƛόγιστου at 604d9 and ἀυοἡτῳ at 605b8 to be descriptions rather than names.) It is simply contrasted with the superior part and defined as the opposite of this part. At 603a1 it is τὸ πὰρα τὰ μέτρα δοζὰζου; at 603a7 it is τὸ τούτῳ ἐυαυτιούμϵυου; at 603a12 it is the part πόρρω ϕρουήσϵωζ. and at 605bl the poet associates with a part of the soul ‘which is not the best': μὴ πρὸζ τὸ βέƛτιστου.

20 603b7-c4. I read ϵἰδωƛοποιοῦυτα, following Adam. Compare eidōla in this passage with eidōla aretēs at 600e5.

21 Republic IV.432a-b, 442c-d. See especially the definition of sophrosynē as 'agreement of better and worse as to which should rule’ at IV.431d-e, and compare Republic Ill.401a-402a, where Plato discusses the role of musical education in leading children to love the noble and hate the shameful before they are able to receive logos, reason.

22 See note 19, above.

23 See the discussion by Hall, R., ‘Plato's Theory of Art: A Reassessment,’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 33 (1974) 78–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar, noting the importance of both emotion and reason in Plato's theory.

24 Republic VIII.S18d9-519a6 contrasts the production of the ‘other virtues of the soul’ by means of ethos with the education of the intelligence.

25 Among the many discussions of the question of the consistency of the psychology of Republic X with that of Republic IV are those of Adam, ad 602cff; Penner, T., Thought and Desire in Plato,’ in Vlastos, G., Plato II (New York 1971), 96–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 100-103; Moline, J., ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Soul; AGPH. 60 (1978) 1–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Murphy, N.R., The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford 1951), 239-43Google Scholar.

26 It is equally misleading to identify the superior and inferior elements of the soul of Book X with the dunameis of the soul, doxa and epistēmē, of Republic V. It is true that the objects of doxa -the many beautiful things, and especially the beautiful sights and sounds of the rural dramatic festivals (5.47Sd-e) - are very much like the phainomena that dominate the inferior part of the soul in Republic X. However, while the objects of epistēmē are the Forms, the onta that rule the logistikon are not Forms but qualities of particular objects and actions that do not seem to be different from the ‘actions and bodies’ with which the Forms associate at 476a. Again, those concerned with realities in Book X live very much in the practical world, unlike the philosopher of Book V. And, finally, the statement at X.602e6 and 602e8 that the soul has opposite opinions about the same things at the same time (ἅμα πϵρὶ ταὐτά) should be contrasted with the statement at 5.478a-b that doxa and epistēmē are distinguished precisely by their concern with different objects (ἐπ´ ἄƛƛῳ ἄƛƛη: 478a12-13). See below, note 31 for a parallel of another sort between Republic X and Republic VIII.

27 See 606el-3: ‘Homer has educated Greece.'

28 Elsewhere Plato frequently compares the lower part of the soul and inferior things to children and the many. For some examples see Adam, ad 379c and Boyancé, P., Le Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes Grecs (Paris 1936) 155Google Scholarff. Boyancé cites Phaedo 77e, where Cebes says that there is ‘a child in us’ that fears death, though ‘we’ don't do so: μᾶƛƛου δὲ μὴ ὡζ ἡμῶν δϵδιότων ἀƛƛ´ ἴσωζ ἴνι τιζ χαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖζ.

29 Republic X.595a2, 607a5-6, 607d8-9 mention ‘the city.’ 608bl and 605b7-8 speak of ‘the city in us.'

30 ‘To harm’ (ƛωβᾶσθαι) occurs at 605c7. Compare ‘harm’ (ƛώβη) at 595b5 and contrast 'destroys’ (ἀπόƛƛνσι) at 605b4.

31 The corruption of the reasonable man by mimetic poetry in some ways closely parallels the transformation of the oligarchic man and city into the democratic man and city in Republic VIII.555b-560d. The oligarchic man is ruled by necessary desires (559c-d) but also has unnecessary desires that he rules by force (558d4, cf. 606a3: ‘that which is held down by force’). He is raised 'without education’ (559d7, cf. 606a7-8: ‘insufficiently educated’) and so is tempted by ‘all sorts of manifold pleasures’ (559d9-10, cf. 604e5: ‘all sorts of men,’ and 605a5: ‘the complaining and manifold character’ imitated by the poet). Stasis arises in the soul of the oligarchic man (560al-2, cf. 603dl and 3: 'he is in stasis’). The oligarchic man is transformed into a democratic man when his unnecessary desires are given aid ‘from without’ (559e6, cf. 606a6-7: ‘this is the part of us filled and pleased by the poets’). If the manifold democratic desires win the battle and seize the acropolis of the oligarchic man's soul, they drive out sophrosynē and ‘measure’ (560b-d, cf.603a4: ‘measure and calculation’), setting up the ‘pleasant and manifold polity’ of democracy (558c4-5, cf. the ‘evil polity’ of 605b7-8). The oligarchic man then becomes a democratic man, ruled by unnecessary desires (561a), each in turn (cf. 606a5-8: the 'sweetened Muse’ makes pleasure and pain rule in the city). The parallel between the two passages is not exact, for there is nothing in Republic VIII comparable to the ‘letting down one's guard’ of Republic X; the contrast in Republic X is not made in terms of necessary and unnecessary desires, as it is in Republic VIII, and the soul of the reasonable man in Republic X is only temporarily ruled by the inferior democratic element.

32 Cf Republic III.395c7-dl, where Plato says that the guardians should not imitate bad models ‘lest from the imitation they get the reality.' Allotria pathē is a nice pun here, as it was at 604e5-6. On the one hand it means ‘alien affections,’ that is, emotions proper to a kind of disposition alien to one's own. The many in the theater find the superior disposition alien (604e) and the reasonable man finds alien the disposition of someone who ‘laments out of season’ (606b). On the other hand, allotria pathē deliberately alludes to Gorgias’ theory that the soul experiences an affection of its own on hearing of others’ experiences in poetry: ἐπ´ ἀƛƛοτρίων τϵ πραγμάτων χαὶ σωμάτων ϵὐτυχίαιζ χαὶ δυσπραγίαιζ ἰδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν ƛόγων ἔπαθϵ ἡ ψυχή (Encomium of Helen, DK Bll.9). Max Pohlenz, ‘Die Anfänge der griechischen Poetik,’ NGG 1920, 169 = Kleine Schriften II (Hildesheim 1964), 463, notes Plato's allusion to Gorgias at 604e and in other passages. We may also compare Gorgias’ πόθοζ ϕιƛοπϵνθήζ (Hel. 9) with Plato's πϵπϵινηχὸζ τοῦ δαχρῦσαι (606a4); Gorgias’ ἔƛϵον ἐπαυζῆσαι (Hel. 8) with Plato's θρέψαντα … ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐƛϵινόν (606b7-8). Examples could be multiplied.

33 This mistake is one we make only in the theater, as is clear from the context of 605c10-606b8.

34 Note the change from ‘play and not serious’ (παιδιάν τινα χαὶ οὐ σπουδήν: 602b8) of the section dealing with the children and fools to ‘serious’ in the later section (σπουδάζοντϵζ: 605d4, σπουδαστέον: 608a6).

35 Though it does not mention Republic X, Freud's ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming,’ Neue Revue, 1 (1908) 716-24, rpt. in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9, Strachy, J., ed. (London 1959), 143-54Google Scholar, can in many ways be read as a perceptive analysis of Plato's theories: ‘The creative writer does the same thing as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously - that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion - while separating it sharply from reality … Many things, which if they were real, could give no enjoyment, can do so in the play of phantasy, and many excitements which, in themselves, are actually distressing, can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of a writer's work’ (144). ‘Our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds. It may even be that not a little of this effect is due to the writer's enabling us thenceforward to enjoy our own daydreams without self-reproach or shame’ (153).

36 Republic X.607e7 speaks of the erōs of mimetic poetry that we have been given by our upbringing in ‘these fine cities.’ We must, says Plato, refrain from this erōs if we discover that it is not useful (607e5). This passage recalls the discussion of the standard of the useful at 601-602.

37 This is the meaning of the verbs παραδέχϵσθαι (595a5, 595a6, 607a4) and χαταδέχϵσθαι (607c6) that Plato uses of receiving poetry into the city.

38 This is the avowed aim of Republic X. The book begins with the statement that knowledge of psychology, of the “parts of the soul’ (595a7-8), can help us understand why poetry harms ‘those who don't have the drug of knowing the truth about these matters’ (595b5-7).

39 An earlier version of this paper was read at Cornell University, The University of Minnesota and Claremont Graduate School, where I benefited from much helpful discussion. I am particularly indebted to James Bogen of Pitzer College, Charles Young of Claremont Graduate School and to the anonymous referees of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for criticism and advice.