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Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Terrence M. Penner
Terrence M. Penner*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI53706, U.S.A.
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Extract

One natural way of explaining the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will, would be this: to describe a conflict between a desire that is more or less rational (that represents, or corresponds to, a considered judgment on what is to be done), and a desire that is rather less rational, where the less rational desire wins out ‘against one’s better judgment.’ To explain what makes two such desires conflicting desires (as opposed to being just two different desires), it is then natural to suggest that they originate in distinct ‘parts of the soul’ (or in distinct ‘partitions of the mind’).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 16: Canadian Philosophers — Celebrating Twenty Years of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 1990 , pp. 35 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1990

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