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Particulars in Phaedo, 95e — 107a

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

F. C. White
F. C. White*
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania
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Extract

In this paper there are two claims that I wish to defend. One is that in Socrates’ much discussed “causal” theory concrete particulars are more central than Forms. The other is that these concrete particulars are held by Plato to be not simply bundles of characteristics, not mere meeting-points of Forms, but independent individuals, existing in their own right.

It will not, I believe, be questioned that from one point of view the prime concern of the Phaedo is with concrete particulars; not with Forms, characteristics, or anything else. For, the overriding aim of the dialogue is, surely, to persuade us each to care for his own soul; it is for this reason that arguments are put forward to show that souls are indestructible. But there is no doubt that these souls are particulars.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 2: New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics , 1976 , pp. 129 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1976

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