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Darwin's Algorithm, Natural Selective History, and Intentionality Naturalized

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Philip Hanson
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Extract

Dan Dennett and Jerry Fodor have recently offered diametrically opposed estimations of the relevance of the theory of natural selection to an adequate theory of intentionality. In this paper, I show, first, how this opposition can be traced largely to differences both in their respective understandings of what the theory of natural selection includes, and in their respective ‘pre-theoretic’ takes on the datum to be explained by a theory of intentionality. These differences, in tum, have been ‘pre-selected’ by contrasting outlooks on the general nature of the explanatory enterprise. While no final adjudication of these large issues is attempted, I argue, second, that it is important to distinguish two rather different questions about the relevance of natural selection to the nature of intentionality, and that, having done so, one can see that, from standpoints purely internal to their respective projects, Dennett and Fodor each in his own way misconstrues the relevance of natural selection.

Type
I. Adaptation and the Mental
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 27: Naturalism, Evolution & Intentionality , 2001 , pp. 53 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2001

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