Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
The implications of evolutionary theory for a theory of knowledge have been explored by numerous writers in the period since Darwin. (See, for example: Spencer [1857]; Toulmin [1967, 1972]; Popper [1965, 1972, 1974]; Campbell [1974].) In general, these writers have developed theories of knowledge development by analogy with evolutionary theory. That is, they have developed theories which apply the mechanism of differential selection on variation to the growth of knowledge. In this sense knowledge is seen to be a function of success (often understood in pragmatic terms) in a field of alternative ideas. Knowledge evolves in much the same way as organisms with more robust ideas or ideas with greater verisimilitude or greater explanatory power or greater problem solving ability, etc. surviving from one generation to the next in the struggle for acceptance. Hence, the title ‘evolutionary epistemology.’